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Abstract 
Colombia has been seriously affected by terrorism and criminal organizations 
operating in its territory. FARC, ELN, AUC, and drug trafficking organizations op-
erating in the country have developed into a regional threat and seriously erode 
democracy and the rule of law for parts of the population. In August 7 2002, 
President Alvaro Uribe came into office backed by a clear mandate to strengthen 
the rule of law and the authority of the state throughout the nation.  
 
With a clear goal in mind, and recognizing the importance of intelligence in the 
war against terrorism, the Uribe administration has initiated a pushed for a trans-
formation to increase the effectiveness of intelligence agencies, through, among 
others, their integration into an effective interagency community. It has proved no 
easy feat. Similarly to experiences lived by other countries, the intelligence agen-
cies have different backgrounds, confusing tasks and little interest in working 
closer.  
 
Structural, cultural and political issues affect the integration process of the intelli-
gence agencies. Lack of knowledge on the part of the intelligence consumers 
has also played a historic role in their evolution. Although major improvements 
have been achieved in the last ten years, through cooperation with countries like 
the United States of America and the United Kingdom, much remains to be done.  
 
While some of the elements required for an effective transformation have been 
set out, others remain awaiting. In the process of integration some successes 
have been accomplished, but setbacks have also happened. A continued effort 
towards further integration, a process that has already been started, will be the 
only way for the intelligence agencies to defeat an adversary, that in the case of 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
Colombia is the third largest South American country in terms of population and the fourth 
largest in terms of territory. Geographic factors that have been deepened by historical, 
economic and trade processes have created an invisible division between the country’s 
largely populated and industrial north and sparsely inhabited south mainly made up of 
tropical forests and jungle. Due to its large 
size and comparatively small population, the 
Colombian state has had historic difficulties 
in imposing effective control over the whole 
territory, a fact that has facilitated the emer-
gence of individuals or organizations that 
challenge the state’s authority and its legiti-
mate monopoly over the use of force. 
As a result, and although Colombians like to 
think of themselves as one of the oldest de-
mocracies in the continent with only a brief 
four year interruption between 1953 and 
1957, a more detailed analysis of the coun-
try’s situation and its democratic regime car-
ries a different conclusion. According to Ed-
uardo Pizarro and Ana Maria Bejarano:  
In the best of cases, the [Colombian] state’s glaring incapacity to provide security 
and justice leads to a paradoxical situation in which democratic rights (participa-
tion and competition) are respected, while democracy’s liberal components (hu-
man rights and civil liberties) are systematically violated1.  
In their view,  
During the last decade and a half, Colombia has witnessed both an improvement 
in the dimensions of political participation and contestation and a severe deteriora-
tion in the dimensions related to effective protection of civil liberties and subordina-
tion of the military. Consequently, the Colombian political regime is difficult to clas-
Map 1 




sify, since it is neither a full democracy nor an authoritarian regime. The term 
“semidemocracy” seems most appropriate to us.2 
This overall context of weak state control and erosion of the rule of law has given way dur-
ing the last forty years to the growth of illegal armed organizations that emerged first as 
guerrilla movements during the 1960s, but which have since transformed themselves to 
become highly criminalized organizations largely involved in terrorist activities. Although 
over time organizations such as the M-19 (April 19 Movement) and the Popular Liberation 
Army (Ejercito Popular de Liberacion – EPL) reintegrated to society through successful 
peace processes3 during 1989-1994, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuer-
zas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), the National Liberation Army (Ejer-
cito de Liberacion Nacional - ELN) and the United Self Defences of Colombia (Autode-
fensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) did not reach any similar agreement by 2002, regard-
less of repeated attempts by different administrations to consolidate peace negotiations4.  
This situation changed during the Uribe administration. The AUC, a right wing terrorist or-
ganization5 which grew in some areas as a response from cattle ranchers, landowners and 
peasants to actions carried out by left wing guerrilla groups in the 1980s and then went on 
to enmesh with the illegal drug trade6, finalized in April 2006 a disarming, demobilization 
and reintegration process that had begun in 20037. The ELN, a Cuban inspired left wing 
guerrilla movement dating back to 19628 initiated in December 2005 exploratory talks with 
the government “in search of initiating a peace process”9, which although not yet formally 
reached has nonetheless seen some progress.        
The remaining group, the Marxist oriented FARC, founded in 1964, continues to present 
the greatest danger to stability in Colombia10. A description by Mary Anastasia O’Grady 
ten years ago, reflects very closely the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia aims.  
[FARC are] Well financed by narco-trafficking, kidnapping and extortion..., main-
tain some  60 units throughout the Colombian countryside and an army of 10,000. 
They strike small towns after midnight, killing police, local politicians and peasants. 
They rob banks, free prisoners from jails, burn down buildings and steal food and 
supplies. In rural areas they destroy oil pipelines. They also like kidnapping. The 
little popular support they have - most campesinos who cooperate do so out of 
fear - is achieved by protecting peasants’ coca fields.11 
Little has changed since then, even though their links with terrorism, the drug trade and 
kidnapping and extortion have expanded. Although they come from different backgrounds 
and have had different transformation processes, by 2002 FARC, ELN and AUC had 
earned the label of “unabashed terrorists”12. 
The terrorists’ criminal record only goes to validate this assertion. According to figures re-
leased by the Colombian Ministry of Defence, during the 1998-2002 period an average of 
1470 terrorist attacks, 1900 kidnappings and 370 attacks against transmission towers were 
being carried out annually by these groups13. By 2002, the country not only had the high-
est level of kidnappings in the world, but also, with close to 30,000 homicides, one of the 
highest murder rates14.  
To counter this situation, on August 7 2002, President Alvaro Uribe came into office 
backed by a clear mandate to strengthen the rule of law and the authority of the state 
throughout the whole country. Speaking shortly after his election, Mr. Uribe described the 
support received to his candidacy as a demonstration to “the international community...” of 
the Colombian citizens’ “... will to recover civility and order”15. This mandate was reflected 
in the publication in 2003 of the Democratic Defence and Security Policy, the first ever Co-
lombian Government defence policy16, whose objectives included the “consolidation of 
state control over the territory”, “protection of the population” and the “elimination of illegal 
drug trade in Colombia.”17 
According to the new policy the immediate threats facing “...the nation, the democratic in-
stitutions and the lives of the Colombian citizens” are “...terrorism, illegal drugs trade, illicit 
trade of small arms, explosives and ammunition, homicide, and kidnapping and extor-
tion”18. All of these threats are attributable in a higher or lesser degree to the actions of 
classic terrorist-bandit organizations such as the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, and to 
criminal organizations such as the new regional drug cartels that emerged after the decline 
of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the mid nineties19.   
To counter these illegal organizations, intelligence has been identified as one critical ele-
ment. President Uribe made this point strongly during a speech given at an intelligence of-
ficers’ graduation ceremony in October 2002, “Paucity, insufficiency and a lack of coordi-
nation in government information and intelligence operations and, what can be even 
worse, rivalry between the agencies responsible for collecting and managing this infor-
mation and intelligence, has been mentioned over and over again as the first and foremost 
 5
flaw of our public security system” 20. It is therefore not surprising that the Defence and 
Security Policy contains several references to the various intelligence agencies and the 
need for them to restructure in order to become more efficient tools for the State’s security 
requirements.  
For Colombia’s war on terror and banditry a crucial problem was one of intelligence frag-
mentation; there are no less than six separate agencies with direct responsibilities over the 
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination processes. The Army21, Navy22 and Air 
Force23 each have an intelligence service, although according to their internal organiza-
tion, the Army’s intelligence unit (Direccion de Inteligencia) is part of J-3 (the Operations 
Staff), whilst for the Navy (Jefatura de Inteligencia Naval - JINA) and Air Force (Jefatura 
de Inteligencia) the intelligence units are independent commands. The National Police24 
has an Intelligence Directorate of its own which answers directly to the Deputy Director of 
the National Police and as recently as August 1999, a new intelligence agency, the Finan-
cial Information and Analysis Unit (Unidad de Inteligencia y Analisis Financiero - UIAF), 
under the Ministry of Economy was set up to expand and systematize the exchange of fi-
nancial intelligence information25. Finally, there is the specialized secret service in Colom-
bia, the Security Administrative Department (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad - 
DAS), the only intelligence agency linked directly to the President, which as described by 
Jeremy McDermott, “...combines the powers and roles of the UK’s Security Service, Secret 
Intelligence Service, Special Branch, Customs and Excise and the US Secret Service” 26. 
Unfortunately, and because of the way in which successive governments have been deal-
ing with the threats to the country’s security and the tools to counter them, the intelligence 
agencies’ tasks have overlapped and blended, generating administrative confusion in the 
way they carry out their missions27. In this context, duplication of tasks is a common prob-
lem, which not only reduces the effectiveness of the individual security agencies actions, 
but also increases the demand for very scarce resources to achieve high standards.  As a 
result, the military intelligence agencies, the Police Intelligence Directorate (DIPOL), and 
the secret service replicate their functions and often compete with one another by accident 
or design.  
The Secret Service stands as a prime example of this bureaucratic confusion. The DAS 
must, as part of its national mission, provide strategic intelligence, security for the Presi-
dent and the Ministers, and serve as the link for INTERPOL in Colombia. Because of the 
lack of clarity in its mission, it is even, as former Director, Jorge Noguera told Jane’s Intel-
ligence Review in an interview, “... getting new equipment, and better weapons for the ex-
ecutive arm so we can be more autonomous and effective. For example, we are creating 
[a] specialized group for hostile arrests"28. But some of these functions are carried out by 
the National Police and others by the Armed Forces, two institutions that in any case are 
far better suited than the DAS to act as executive authorities.  
Another factor that has worked against the effectiveness of the Colombian intelligence 
agencies has been the penetration from narcoterrorism. Although it is difficult to establish 
the exact dimension of the infiltration by terrorist groups and drug trafficking organizations, 
over the years cases involving individuals from the intelligence agencies working for these 
criminal organizations have been known to the public and accounted for in some detail29. 
However, the real extent of their influence over the intelligence agencies remains a vague-
ly known matter, closer to a witch-hunt and imaginary assumptions between individuals 
than to precise facts.         
For their part, the military intelligence and police intelligence must provide operational and 
tactical intelligence for the Armed Forces and National Police operations against the 
FARC, ELN and AUC as well as the drug cartels. In this scenario, cooperation between 
them is essential. The truth is that it is poor due to a number of factors, not least the fact 
that sharing information might mean another service will get the credit for a successful op-
eration. This systemic fragmentation and competition between Colombia’s intelligence ser-
vices means that the result is a weak and uncoordinated service for decision makers and a 
waste of taxpayers’ money.  
Finally, the fact that the major threats have a large domestic component makes the link 
between intelligence and law enforcement a fundamental aspect that has not yet been en-
tirely addressed. It also means that the intelligence cooperation that Colombia has been 
receiving over the years from the United States of America, and which has exerted an im-
portant influence over intelligence doctrine and operations, is ill-suited to confront an inter-
nal challenge, as can be seen from the current debate over the lack of adequate intelli-
gence structures to confront an internal enemy30.   
To face this situation, Colombia’s intelligence agencies and their reporting structures need 
to be reformed and reorganized to ensure better cooperation and information sharing. A 
coordinated structure that can capture all the pieces involved in the intelligence process 
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and re-arrange them to provide decision makers with the intelligence needed to defeat the 
various terrorist and criminal organizations is an urgent national requirement.  
1.2. Aim and Enabling Objectives 
The aim of this study is to explore the level of integration within the Colombian intelligence 
community and to recommend courses of action and policies to improve that level of inte-
gration.  
The objectives of the study are: 
• To examine ways in which key national security policy issues, embodied in the Demo-
cratic Defence and Security Policy, rely on effective intelligence and effective intelligence 
support; 
• To examine current approaches supporting intelligence management (consolidation and 
analysis) used by the Colombian Government; 
• To define roles and missions of the intelligence agencies; 
• To identify the degree and results of joint working and intelligence integration within the 
existing intelligence agencies; and 
• To propose courses of action and make policy recommendations for effective integration 
of intelligence agencies to be adopted by the Colombian Government. 
1.3. Rationale 
Throughout history, intelligence has been used as a tool for decision makers to make time-
ly and well informed choices, based on an “assumption that facts and insight are better 
than ignorance in charting a nation’s course” 31. Although the assumption might seem ob-
vious, there are a number of recent examples that reflect a certain indifference towards the 
structure and functioning of the intelligence agencies in many nations. 
From Joseph Stalin’s repeated disregard for his intelligence staff’s reports on the immi-
nence of a German attack32 to the United States Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s dis-
banding of the United States diplomatic code-breaking team because “Gentlemen don’t 
read each other’s mail” 33 to more recent episodes, like the heedlessness shown by US 
high-level policymakers to the 1995 Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center 
warnings on the likeliness of “aerial terrorism... filling an airplane with explosives and dive-
bombing a target” 34, there are plenty of examples of how intelligence is sometimes ig-
nored by policy makers or left to its own devices. On the other hand, there is also the case 
that within any general theory of intelligence, there is no “right” structure or organization, 
as well as no wrong one. As Peter Wilson has pointed out, intelligence and intelligence re-
forms need to be “...carefully tailored to each country’s unique political situation” 35. It is a 
difficult balance to achieve from scratch with a blank sheet of paper; and even harder to 
restructure existing policies and long established organizations to meet new challenges. 
For Colombia, defining how much intelligence is needed and what form that intelligence 
should take has not been an easy task, not least because, as Lock Johnson has pointed 
out, “the answer [to how much intelligence] depends on the scope of a nation’s foreign pol-
icy objectives, its sense of danger at home and abroad, and its affluence” 36. This is one 
aspect in which successive Colombian Governments have failed.  
Until 2002, Colombia lacked a coherent defence and security policy that would give “politi-
cal direction to the nation’s defence resources as a whole, with a view to ensuring national 
security, protecting vital interests and furthering the international aims of the state”37. As 
stated by the United States Military Attache in Colombia in 1999, Colonel William Spra-
cher, during a seminar held by the National Defense University: “The most serious defi-
ciency Colombia confronts is the lack of a national strategy outlined by the civilian gov-
ernment to initiate the tasks with the compromise of the whole of society to resolve the 
conflict” 38. In this sense, and being as they are part of the security establishment, intelli-
gence resources were not being directed at a strategic objective. 
With the new Democratic Defence and Security Policy not only has there been a definition 
of threats and goals, but also the intelligence resources have been given a coherent task 
to help in the attainment of the objectives defined by the security policy. One central ele-
ment in the orientation given to the intelligence community is the need for greater integra-
tion of its various components. As stated by the policy: “The Armed Forces professionali-
zation process will be accompanied by an effort to increase coordination and joint work, 
both within the Armed Forces and among the latter and other law enforcement and judicial 
state institutions. Reflection of this is the coordination of intelligence” 39. 
The policy goes on to create a Joint Intelligence Committee which is instructed to  
Produce consolidated strategic intelligence analysis, so the President and the De-
fence Minister have the required information for the decision-making process; to 
translate the governments security policies into intelligence requirements; and to 
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coordinate the tasking of the different requirements, promoting specialization and 
eliminating duplicity of efforts among those involved.40  
Unfortunately, and although some steps in the right direction have been taken, there still 
appears to be a long way to go in the integration of the intelligence agencies. Lack of co-
ordination, confusing tasks and the demand for immediate short-term results posed by, in-
ter alia, the Government’s pressure to improve local security conditions, has continued to 
erode the integration efforts. A reflection of this lack of integration was seen during the 
capture in Ecuador of a senior level member of the FARC, on January 2, 2004. Ovidio 
Palmera, also known as “Simon Trinidad”, was captured on a street in Quito, Ecuador, 
whilst undergoing a routine check of his identification papers, according to Ecuatorian au-
thorities, and Colombian security forces had no role to play in the operation. At least this 
was the official version41.  
But this cover story collapsed when a surveillance video tape of “Simon Trinidad’s” in Qui-
to was leaked to the press by the Colombian Army. Apparently, the tape was leaked be-
cause the Army wanted to show its involvement in the operation. Up to that point the Ar-
my’s silence had misguided the Press in to assuming that the Colombian Police had been 
the leading actors in the capture42. It was a clear case of inter service rivalry, with disas-
trous results. With the videotape and interviews that followed, secret sources were uncov-
ered, covert operations compromised and the preparations for follow-on operations and 
intelligence gathering against other FARC members destroyed. The conclusion from this 
case – which is by no means unique - is the overriding need for intelligence coordination 
and control to prevent future re-occurrences and a clear requirement for greater integration 
of the intelligence agencies as a priority for Colombia’s national security. 
1.4. Conceptual Framework  
This paper will begin by evaluating the theory and practice of intelligence. Taking into ac-
count the predominance of western intelligence writings, these will be used as the founda-
tion for the document. As the subject of intelligence is fairly broad, this document will con-
centrate on the definition of intelligence, how it is expected to work in theory and how it ef-
fectively operates in practice. This will lead to lead the integration issue among the intelli-
gence community, a view that will be applied to the Colombian case.  
In understanding the way the Colombian intelligence agencies interact, it is necessary to 
draw a static picture of the intelligence community according to its institutional and formal 
arrangements and compare it with a more dynamic vision of how the system effectively 
works and how not only structure, but also culture and power politics play a role. As a re-
sult of this balance, between the static and dynamic visions, the issues that need to be 
addressed will emerge. With a scheme of the impending issues, the conclusions will deliv-
er the basis for the recommendations that will be formulated to overcome the difficulties 
experienced by the Colombian intelligence agencies and to transform them into an effec-
tive community, where interaction and cooperation are deeply entrenched values. Figure 1 
describes the process that will be followed by this paper.  
1.5. Research Methodology 
Because of the nature of the issues to be discussed in this paper, a priority will be given to 
information gathered from primary sources, for in intelligence, there is no perfect structure 
to look for in the books. In intelligence there can be no “one size fits all” and every solution 
must be tailored to suit each country’s national factors and individual needs. Furthermore, 
the integration of existing intelligence agencies requires that a number of important factors 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
                                     Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
Source: the author. 
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other than mere theoretical structure must be taken into account. It is what Peter Wilson 
calls the “interlocking perspectives of organizational structure (how the organization looks 
on paper), culture (how people behave) and power politics (where the power really lies) to 
understand an institution” 43. So even though structures can be drawn in books, culture 
and power politics are much harder to obtain.  
In this sense, the primary focus will be the interviews with the “prime sources”: the different 
actors involved in the Colombian intelligence process, including the heads of the Army 
(DINTE), Navy (JINA), and Air Force Intelligence, the head of the National Police Intelli-
gence Agency (DIPOL), the Director of the Finance Intelligence and Analysis Unit (UIAF) 
and the Director of the Security Administrative Department (DAS). Other structures which 
also deal with intelligence, and therefore have a say in any valuable research, are the 
Armed Forces Joint Intelligence and Counterintelligence section (Jefatura de Inteligencia y 
Contrainteligencia  Militar Conjunta - J2), which has a separate organization altogether 
from the three services’ agencies, the Judicial Police (Direccion de Policia Judicial - DIJIN) 
and the Attorney General’s Technical Investigation Body (Cuerpo de Investigacion Tecnica 
- CTI). 
Finally, and because of their experience and relation with the issue, interviews are planned 
with former Defence Minister Mr. Jorge Alberto Uribe Echavarria, and with the Chairman of 
the Joint Chief of Staff, General Freddy Padilla de Leon. The information collected from 
these interviews and the other interviews will constitute the primary material for the project. 
This means that the outcome of this study will depend largely on the answers that will be 
given by the interviewees and their own views based on first hand experience. The result 
of this essentially practical and utilitarian methodology means that, notwithstanding that all 
interviews will have to conform to Cranfield University’s academic guidelines and be ap-
proved by the project supervisors, there is no way to ensure the absolute veracity of the 
information submitted.  
Apart from primary sources, the project will require extensive research from a number of 
secondary sources such as governmental decrees and orders which contain the structures 
and functions by which intelligence agencies are expected to operate. Unfortunately – but 
unsurprisingly - not much open source literature on intelligence matters can be found on 
the Colombian case, not least because of the lack of civilian knowledge on the matter. As 
noted by former Defence Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez,  
The main difficulty [to the civil-military relations in Colombia] lies in the absence of 
understanding from the civilians on the nature of the armed conflict and of the role 
the Armed Forces can play in it…For long, us civilians have renounced to our re-
sponsibility to understand security. There are still few who from the civil society – 
the academia for example – study with depth the military sector.44 
As a result, most information must be collected from specialized journals and books written 
on the subject, mainly taking account of the intelligence communities of the United States 
of America and the United Kingdom.   
1.6. Limitations 
Perhaps no other issue will be as limiting for this project as secrecy, a basic element in the 
intelligence culture. As described by Abram Shulsky, “With respect to intelligence agen-
cies, this basic problem is compounded by secrecy, even though secrecy springs from the 
legitimate need to keep knowledge of certain intelligence sources, methods, and activities 
secret from the public and restricted to the smallest possible number of officials within the 
government” 45. Herman has also stated how “Secrecy is intelligence’s trademark: the ba-
sis of its relationship with government and its own self image” 46. Although this project will 
not touch on intelligence operations currently underway, it will deal with how things are 
done, which might not be considered useful among a conservative institution like the mili-
tary.  
This is especially true in the actual circumstances in which the Colombian security sector 
is being employed to its maximum capacity in eliminating terrorism, narcotrafficking, and 
kidnapping and extortion, while at the same time regaining territorial control and protecting 
the population. Under this situation, one would expect a similar response to the one 
Churchill received when trying to transform the British Intelligence Service during the Sec-
ond World War, and that is accurately described by Christopher Andrew: “How, he 
[Churchill] provocatively asked his Chiefs of Staff, was intelligence organized, and who 
was the man responsible for it? The Chiefs replied that the attractions of a single secret 
service were outweighed by many ‘grave disadvantages’: ‘it seems to us very undesirable 
that a drastic reorganization of this magnitude should be attempted at the very moment 
when we are fighting for our lives” 47. The case for change in Colombia may similarly be 
categorized as inappropriate because of the very real conflict the Security Forces are 
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fighting and also because of the positive results that have been achieved during the four 
years of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy.  
At the same time, positive results achieved by the Security Forces recently naturally gen-
erate a stronger support from the population, making it harder to impose any measure that 
can be seen as a threat to the status quo. Other limitations arise from the fact that most of 
the people interviewed are public servants who will invariably try to show good results and 
stick to the government line. Human nature being what it is, apparent successes, turf wars 
and bureaucratic inertia can be expected to combine to prevent change, particularly from 
those who feel most threatened. The result is that there is a real danger of misleading data 
and even “withheld data” in a study such as this, and not only for reasons of classification 
and national security. As stated by Colonel John Hughes Wilson:  
Turning over stones invariably lets a hard sunlight onto some areas that many 
would prefer to remain hidden or forgotten… There are many other government of-
ficials and intelligence officers, in all regimes, who would much prefer to remain 
creatures of the shadows and keep their blunders and bad decisions secret, if only 
to protect their reputations, careers and pensions. Secrecy in intelligence matters 
is not always for the highest motives.48 
This combination may well hinder the efforts to acquire the accurate information necessary 
to judge the reality of the level of integration between the intelligence agencies. Turkeys 
tend not to vote for Christmas. 
1.7. Structure 
This paper will follow the following structure: Chapter 2 will review the intelligence theory 
and the organizational challenges to a successful transformation of the intelligence sector 
by way of a review of the appropriate literature. Chapter 3 will outline the existing Colom-
bian intelligence agencies, their structures, roles and their interaction. Chapter 4 will pre-
sent the findings and will discuss them in the Colombian context, including the way in 
which culture and power politics play a role in the intelligence sector. Finally, Chapter 5 will 
present the main conclusions, any policy recommendations and identify the areas that 
could not, for whatever reason, be covered by the present research but that should be, in 
the author’s opinion, further evaluated.   
 
 
CHAPTER 2. HOW IT WORKS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTELLIGENCE 
This Chapter examines the available literature on intelligence. In common with many other 
subjects, writers on intelligence theory do sometimes offer conflicting definitions and anal-
ysis. It therefore also seeks to assess the relative merits of the various unclassified writ-
ings on intelligence. 
2.1. Towards a shared definition 
I have called you to me because you wrote on the campaigns of Frederick the 
Great, because you understand their army, and because you have thoroughly 
studied the theatre of operation. You may assist me with valuable information.49 
With these words, Napoleon addressed Antoine de Jomini, one of the most celebrated 
writers on the art of war, before heading to fight the Prussians. Napoleon had turned this 
collecting of information into a habit, one of various elements that gave him superiority in 
the battlefield. According to Jay Luvaas, 
Long before beginning the active operations, Napoleon habitually turned to history 
and geography (along with politics and statistics) to find all that could be learned 
about the enemy and the likely theater of operation. When he assumed command 
of the Army of Italy in 1796 he had ordered the Depot General de la Guerre  to 
send him the memoirs of generals who  had previously campaigned in northern It-
aly along with detailed maps of the area. In 1798 before embarking for Egypt he 
put together a substantial library that contained 125 titles on history and the mem-
oirs of the great generals, plus books on geography, travel, the Bible, the Koran, 
and Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws - the last three titles catalogued under the 
heading ‘politics’. 50 
Far from being the first leader to discover the potential that derived from the use of intelli-
gence, he was able nonetheless to acquire information about his adversary and use it to 
his advantage in war. As Sun Tzu had stated 2,300 years before,  
The reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy 
whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is 
foreknowledge,... [something which]... cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from 
gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained 
from men who know the enemy situation.51 
 
 
In this sense, the study and practice of intelligence has ended up by fusing all the mean-
ings given to the concept. As a result, intelligence is not only used to refer to processed 
information, of the kind described above and used by Napoleon, but also as an activity, as 
suggested by Sun Tzu, and finally, as a distinct type of organization52. In the words of 
Sherman Kent intelligence can be defined as “a particular (sic) kind of knowledge, the type 
of organization producing this knowledge, and the activity pursued by the organization”53, 
directed towards enhancing the interests of a determined nation. This is as far as the 
agreement goes. 
Even though intelligence is a fairly diffused concept, there is no consensus over a defini-
tion. A brief overview of the existing literature is revealing. While Shulsky defines it as, “in-
formation relevant to a government formulating and implementing policy to further its na-
tional interests and to deal with threats to those interests from actual or potential adver-
saries”54, for Kenney, intelligence means “the collection, analysis and dissemination of in-
formation for government officials involved in the formation and execution of foreign, de-
fense, and economic policy”55. For others, like Hughes-Wilson, intelligence is “processed 
accurate information, presented in sufficient time to enable the decision maker to take 
whatever action is required”56, a concept also shared by Jones, for whom the “ultimate ob-
jective of intelligence is to enable action to be optimized”57. The list of definitions for intelli-
gence could go on, but rather than stick with one specific meaning, they will be used in this 
chapter so that “nevertheless a picture emerges of intelligence’s character”58. 
 
 
2.2  The Intelligence Cycle 
QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (LZW) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
For this, the concept of intelligence as a product, activity and organization will be very use-
ful.  As a product, intelligence can be broadly defined as processed information. For infor-
mation to become intelligence, it has to undergo a process in which it transforms itself from 
raw material to finished product. A basic model called the intelligence cycle allows the 
transformation to be understood clearly. The cycle consists of five phases: direction, col-
lection, collation, analysis, and dissemination59. Figure 1 illustrates how the model works. 
Although the intelligence process does not necessarily follow the strict order that is shown, 
more often than not the direction stage sparks the cycle. In this stage, decision makers, 
also known as the intelligence consumers, be they the President, military, or any other 
senior leader, set out the information requirements needed. In this stage, they direct the 
intelligence efforts towards the knowledge they need to acquire, the “foreknowledge” as 
described by Sun Tzu, “on the assumption that facts and insight are better than ignorance 
in charting a nation’s [or any other organization’s] course”60 and that “intelligence reduces 
the quota of government’s mistakes and misperceptions in its chosen world role, and ena-
bles it to do better than if it had had to manage without it”61.   
These information requirements, which are also known as essential elements of infor-
mation, are then assigned to the different agencies and departments involved in the intelli-
gence process. Notwithstanding that a deeper examination of intelligence organizations 
will follow, suffice it to say that at the collection stage, different agencies with different 
methods and sources will search for the information required. After it has been collected, 
Source: Johnson, L., Bricks 





the information from the different sources must be collated or processed so that it can be 
viewed and understood by the analysts. Due to the different methods in which information 
is acquired, for example satellite images and encrypted communications, they must first be 
converted to easily readable data. 
In the next stage, readable information is analyzed on the basis that “intelligence seldom 
speaks for itself; it must be interpreted by smart, well-trained people who understand the 
country, group or topic at question”62. This is the analyst’s main task, and one of the most 
important phases in the whole intelligence cycle, because it will result in the added value 
to the collected and collated information. Once the information has been analyzed, it will 
become a product to be disseminated among the decision makers that sparked the cycle.  
2.3 Intelligence Principles63 
Albeit the intelligence cycle description illustrates the wide range of activities undertaken 
by intelligence agencies, a few principles must be emphasized. Intelligence needs to be 
timely or otherwise it will be no intelligence at all. In his book Military Intelligence Blunders 
and Other Cover-ups, Colonel John Hughes-Wilson describes the term “overcome by 
events (OBE)”64 as one of the worst responses the intelligence professional can receive 
from the intelligence consumer.  Untimely intelligence is no intelligence at all.  
A second element to be taken into account is the need for information to be accurate. In 
intelligence jargon, it is known as being able to separate the “wheat” from the “chaff”, the 
“signals” from the “noise”65.  Whatever information has been collected needs to be true. 
Otherwise, the intelligence product will lead the decision maker to erroneous conclusions. 
Intelligence history is full of such examples. 
The intelligence cycle, as has been described, is not a static but a continuous process 
sparked by the information needs of a central authority. Centralized control of the intelli-
gence process is therefore necessary for coherent, effective and planned tasking and col-
lection efforts to be possible. Multiple heads imply dispersed efforts from the intelligence 
agencies, with the consequent duplication of efforts and waste of resources. Multiple 
heads also imply that information will not always be accessible to those who need it for the 
decisions to be taken.  
 
 
2.4. Methods and Sources  
The product that results from the intelligence cycle, having accomplished accuracy and 
timeliness, and having answered the information requirements set out by the decision 
makers, can take different shapes and influence different variables. In this sense, adjec-
tives are added to the intelligence product to guide the consumer into the type of intelli-
gence product. For Abram Shulsky, who follows Sherman Kent in this respect, there are 
three main groups: current, basic descriptive, and speculative-evaluative, which respond to 
information from the past, the present and the future66. But many other adjectives are used 
to imply different types of products. There is business intelligence, actionable intelligence, 
tactical intelligence, national intelligence, strategic intelligence, drug and counter drug in-
telligence67, security intelligence68, and many others, all differing not in the way the product 
has been obtained (although invariably the same intelligence cycle pattern will change on 
a case by case basis), but in the purpose for which the intelligence was gathered. 
Even though there are no precise definitions for any of the types of intelligence presented 
above, there are some traits that distinguish them from one another. Tactical intelligence is 
referred to as the “essential elements of enemy information the commander requires in or-
der to make a reasoned decision”69, while counter drug intelligence is defined as “the col-
lection, analysis, and dissemination of information for officials who design and implement 
drug enforcement policies and programs”70. Strategic intelligence is often described   “by 
professional intelligence officers… as the knowledge and foreknowledge of the world 
around us – the prelude to Presidential decision and action”71. In the end, and even though 
they aim to shed light into different levels of action, tactical, operational or strategic, they 
all refer to the same transformation of information into intelligence. 
Intelligence as an activity refers to the sources and methods used to collect and analyze 
information that is used in the intelligence cycle. Although there are various methods of 
gathering information, the broadest categories are Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Tech-
nical Intelligence (TECHINT) and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), all other categories 
falling into one of these three. Human intelligence refers to the information gathered 
through agents, spies, informants, prisoners of war and other sources, either by covert72 or 
overt action73. Technical intelligence can be considered as “a group of techniques using 
advanced technology, rather than human agents, to collect information”74, and include 
photographic or imagery intelligence, also known as PHOTINT and IMINT, and signals in-
telligence or SIGINT75, which includes the interception of communications, cryptanalysis 
 
 
and other signals from sensors or military equipment. Finally, open source intelligence, or 
“the gathering of information from open sources, that is, newspapers, books, radio and tel-
evision broadcasts and any other public source of information”76.  
Apart from open source intelligence, which has gained in importance with the advent of 
internet and the flood of information77 available, a discussion remains about the im-
portance of HUMINT and TECHINT within the intelligence community. Lock Johnson, in 
describing how much intelligence is necessary touched one aspect of the debate between 
HUMINT and TECHINT. In his words,  
Human spies (agents or “assets”) and their handlers (“case officers”) must normal-
ly be paid for their information-gathering services; so must highly educated ana-
lysts for their interpretive skills. And spy machines are phenomenally expensive to 
build, deploy (on land, sea, or in the air), operate, and maintain. A single large 
surveillance satellite, some the size of a Greyhound bus, costs a billion dollars just 
to launch into space - let alone the expense of design, construction, and in-orbit 
management.78 
But there is more to the debate than just costs. HUMINT remains by large the best tool for 
acquiring information on intentions, while TECHINT is primarily used to determine capabili-
ties. Even though there are constant attempts to undermine one at the expense of the oth-
er, in the end, their effectiveness is enhanced when put together to assess the enemy’s 
intentions and capabilities. As has been noted,  
Cameras on satellites and UVAs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] cannot see through 
mud hut roofs or into labyrinth of caves where Al Qaeda terrorists may still be hid-
ing in Afghanistan, or into the vast caverns in North Korea where the government 
of P’yongyang is thought to be constructing weapons of mass destruction. This 
takes a human agent…[yet] machines neither lie nor come down with the flu and 
miss two weeks work.79   
 With regards to the sources, they are varied and depend upon the gathering methods 
used. TECHINT sources include satellite imagery, aerial photo-reconnaissance and crypt-
analysis, while HUMINT sources, further to the ones mentioned above, also include “rou-
tine interviewing of refugees and travelers”80. As with the methods, sources can also be of 
a covert or an open nature. 
 
 
Except for OSINT, which is accessible to the general public, there is a clear association 
between the intelligence activity and secrecy.  According to Michael Herman, this arises 
from the sensitivity linked to the collection and exploitation of intelligence,  
For reasons that include questions of propriety and legality but are mainly based 
on the vulnerability of its sources and methods to countermeasures. From this 
comes intelligence’s special secrecy, extending from collection/exploitation to cov-
er most aspects of analysis. Secrecy is intelligence’s trademark: the basis of its re-
lationship with government and its own self-image.81 
Finally, intelligence can be referred to as an organization which carries out these activities, 
one of whose main characteristics is secrecy. Shulsky notes how 
One of the most notable characteristics of such [intelligence] organizations is the 
secrecy with which their activities must be conducted. Many of their methods of 
operation, such as the use of undercover agents or strict rules concerning access 
to information, derive from this requirement. Since intelligence agencies are orga-
nized to enhance their capacity for secrecy, they also may be given, along with 
their information-obtaining or denying functions, the responsibility of undertaking 
secret activities to advance their government’s foreign policy objectives more di-
rectly.82   
2.5. Intelligence in practice 
In the real world though, things work differently. The lines that separate intelligence as 
product, activity, and organization are continually blurred. The methods and sources uti-
lized in information gathering overlap constantly as do the organizations seeking for stra-
tegic and tactical intelligence. The intelligence consumers may not like the information they 
are receiving or the intelligence community may be perceived as a loose cannon within the 
Government, working on irrelevant information. In Michael Herman’s words, “institutionally 
its [intelligence’s] boundaries are sometimes arbitrary or fuzzy,…, the use of the intelli-
gence label also varies from country to country,.., [and], just as confusing is the variety 
within intelligence itself”83. 
Absence of control and oversight, common elsewhere throughout governmental institu-
tions, hinders the management of intelligence activities and may erode the government’s 
accountability in the long run. Given the need to maintain operations out of the public do-
 
 
main, accountability over the use of resources is scarce at best. It also means that in terms 
of their organizational structure, intelligence agencies are highly independent. Countries 
with mature intelligence communities and developed democracies have only recently cre-
ated legislation accounting for the different intelligence agencies. It was not until 1994 that 
the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was placed on a statutory basis through the 
Intelligence Services Act, which gave the Foreign Secretary “responsibility for the work of 
the SIS, defining the functions of the service and the responsibility of its Chief”84. The 
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), responsible for SIGINT, also oper-
ates under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, while the Security Service, known as MI5, 
was incorporated by the Security Services Act of 198985. 
Notwithstanding the mechanisms that have been created to overcome this lack of ac-
countability, such as executive and legislative control bodies in countries like Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States86, no definite solution has been 
achieved, a fact that is revealed by the number of independent commissions launched to 
review faults, mistakes and abuses in the intelligence community’s activities. As Johnson 
has pointed out,  
National security decision makers face a conundrum: the best intelligence systems 
involve state secrecy, deception and clandestine efforts to steal; yet such systems, 
when turned inward to address foreign threats to vital domestic interests, can 
threaten the very institutions of democracy and representative government that 
they were set up to protect in the first place.87 
But secrecy is not the only challenge that confronts the intelligence community’s activities. 
Subordination of intelligence to policy, received opinion, mirror imaging88, circular intelli-
gence89, lack of integration, duplication and fragmentation90, are also recurrent issues that 
limit the intelligence agencies’ capabilities to perform their tasks properly. One aspect in 
particular, has garnered special attention since the Second World War: the integration of 
intelligence agencies.  
As Stan Taylor and Dan Goldman recall,  
In the case of the IC [Intelligence Community], the primary problem has been the 
existence of overlapping entities with shared jurisdictions, inadequate communica-
tion, and selective intelligence sharing. This problem is not new. The CIA came in-
 
 
to existence because of Pearl Harbor. At least seven different investigations into 
what went wrong led reformers to conclude that inadequate sharing of information 
and competition between the various military intelligence agencies was a signifi-
cant cause of the Japanese surprise. As a result, the National Security Act of 1947 
was passed and, among other things, a ‘central’ intelligence agency was created 
to coordinate intelligence activities and facilitate intelligence sharing and produc-
tion.91     
Forty-nine years later, the Aspin-Brown Commission, a congressional oversight committee 
on the roles and capabilities of the intelligence community came to the conclusion that “in-
telligence agencies should function more closely as a community” and put forth various 
recommendations to that end, among others the rotation of personnel between agencies 
and the creation of a common list of senior posts92. But the problem has persisted to this 
day, as is clear from the 9/11 Commission report,  
The U.S. Government does not presently bring together in one place all terrorism-
related information from all sources. While the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center does 
manage overseas operations and has access to most Intelligence Community in-
formation, it does not collect terrorism-related information from all sources, domes-
tic and foreign. Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately 
share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11. This break-
down in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differ-
ences in the agencies’ missions, legal authorities and cultures. Information was 
not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agen-
cies, but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law 
enforcement agencies.93 
This reluctance to integrate seems to be a widespread trait in most intelligence communi-
ties. In the British case, as noted by Michael Herman,  
Since 1945 most civilian intelligence practitioners have spent their careers in their 
own, single organizations…intelligence is now quite good at promoting knowledge 
of the ‘outside world’. It has been less good at exchanges within the community it-
self. There has been no system for ‘broadening’ postings fro promising officers be-
tween the agencies and the DIS [Defence Intelligence Staff], or between the 
agencies themselves. Half a century of professional intelligence in peacetime pro-
 
 
duced sets of leaders without inside knowledge of each other’s professional disci-
plines, or the community-mindedness that springs from it.94 
Similar accounts of this endemic problem can be found on the Canadian, French, Israeli 
and Indian intelligence services. On the latter, the March 1999 edition of Jane’s Intelli-
gence Review reflected fully the consequences of uncoordinated operations by intelli-
gence agencies in the field. According to the journal,  
India’s civil and defence intelligence agencies are locked in a web of deceit, in-
trigue and rivalry… intelligence sources said ‘Operation Leech’, carried out by the 
three services and the Coast Guard off the Andaman and Nicobar island territory 
against Thai and Burmese gun-runners in February last year, and Operation 
‘Poorab’ three months later had ‘unmasked’ the covert operation being run in 
Burma – unknown to the military – by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), In-
dia’s external intelligence agency to counter growing Chinese influence in Ran-
goon (Yangoon)… A lack of coordination between RAW and military intelligence 
officials and absence of mutual confidence between the two led to serious devel-
opments that still need to be smoothed over.95 
But although it is a problem that has been recognized over and over as one of the main 
obstacles in the work of the intelligence community, little has been achieved to overcome 
it. This has frequently been the case because the solutions to address the problem almost 
always tend to address some immediate political goal rather than longer-term issues. In 
the case of the United States of America, 
Restructuring, particularly the creation of new agencies or sub-agencies, is usually 
the political siren song. Those who can pursue it can say, “look what we have 
done”. But the allure of restructuring is always greater than the reality. All too often 
restructuring merely creates additional units that muddy rather than clarify what is 
really needed – better correlation and communication across agencies and sub-
agencies. Virtually every investigation of IC [Intelligence Community] problems 
points to the need for greater unity and direction.96 
2.6. Structure, culture and power politics 
Structures can be modified easier than organizational culture or the minutiae of the power 
and resource struggles within the bureaucracy, because as the saying goes, old habits die 
 
 
hard, especially in large bureaucracies97. But structures have the least influence in the 
outcome, as can be seen from the American example. After all, and “whereas structure 
can affect practice in positive ways, form should follow function”98. Function is given by the 
way the agencies’ individuals interact, which in turn is influenced by culture and politics. 
Regarding the structure, there is a wide spectrum of options differentiated by coverage 
and function, and ranging from single to all all source agencies and a separation between 
domestic and foreign intelligence or those responsible for both areas. This spectrum is well 
exemplified by the Soviet, British and United States intelligence apparatus. For the West, 
specialization has been preferred. According to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic 
Control of the Armed Forces,  
It is a good rule that each intelligence function [HUMINT and TECHINT] should be 
carried out by one agency. This avoids wasting effort and resources, and minimiz-
es the risk of unhealthy and unnecessary competition between the various agen-
cies…Democratic states generally separate domestic and foreign intelligence ser-
vices. This is justified by the different missions and even more by the fact that dif-
ferent rules and laws apply to intelligence operations on national soil and 
abroad.99 
On the other hand, various authors have determined how culture influences the intelli-
gence community. Dennis Nagy, in questioning the use of investments in developing bet-
ter technologies towards information superiority and dominant battlespace knowledge 
concludes on the importance of other factors in the outcome. In his words, ‘if the policies 
and doctrine are reasonably clear and the enabling technologies are here and getting bet-
ter, why are we not getting better? The answer, in my view, lies principally in what I call 
cultural factors”100, which he goes on to define as “the structure of the Intelligence Com-
munity and DoD [Department of Defence], the attitudes of the members of those organiza-
tions, and the processes that have grown up over the years within and between those enti-
ties and between those entities and the Congress”.101   
In the same line, Jerry Tuttle argues that “the greatest inhibitors to decision superiority are 
cultural and the resistance to share information and intelligence”,102 an argument that is 
shared by James Harris, who referring to the restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Com-
munity after 9/11 supports the idea that “when all is said and done, the joint House and 
 
 
Senate investigations will need to focus on intelligence community culture and business 
practices, not merely on the organizational charts”.103  
Finally, Philip Davies, in an attempt to compare the intelligence cultures in the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom, notes how “Culture in both countries leads to 
intelligence failures that are endemic to political and civil society at large… the United 
States organizational culture of divisiveness, weak consensus and minimal collegiali-
ty…[has meant that] failures in the United States intelligence stem from inadequate or inef-
fective institutional integration”104. Power and resource competition are also issues that 
impede an effective integration of intelligence agencies.  
In his book Keeping us Safe: Secret Intelligence and Homeland Security, Arthur Hulnick 
describes how, 
Intelligence agencies have a tendency not to share particularly sensitive intelli-
gence data with their counterparts in order to protect sources and methods, to be 
sure, but sometimes they withhold the data because having the sensitive material 
gives them power and the ability to one-up the other agencies.105 
Similarly, Charles Cogan notes about the United States intelligence system:  
Assuming that the present system remains more or less intact we are faced with 
the continuing prospect of jockeying between the Pentagon and the CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency], because the lines of authority are not clear; and concomi-
tantly, the continuing accrual of power by the Pentagon at the expense of its 
weaker partner, the CIA.106 
One approach that can be considered as offering an alternative against the lack of integra-
tion is the British intelligence system, in which all agencies meet at a Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC), responsible for the final intelligence product. Despite its apparently more 
efficient structure, the type of interdepartmental organization represented by the JIC has 
been criticized because “it is a forum without managerial teeth. The intelligence coordina-
tor has influence rather than responsibility” 107 and because, 
Depending on consensus increases the likelihood of analysts falling back on 
common assumptions and institutional orthodoxies in formulating assessments 
 
 
that can be agreed upon. In other words, a high degree of collegiality can lead to 
one of the most serious ills of intelligence analysis: group think.108 
Another criticism that is frequently made to the JIC, and which has worried its members 
over the years has been that “the members of the JIS were, perhaps, too closely tied to 
their Departments with the resulting danger that papers sometimes represented the lowest 
common factors in Departmental thinking rather than well-thought-out studies based on 
longer experience”.109 
Even if the JIC could solve the integration of the intelligence agencies, its effect would only 
be felt at the top of the organizations. This approach does not include specific measures 
aimed at enhancing the overall integration of the agencies, a move towards reaching a 
more complete spectrum of analysis for any given situation. In this sense, some writers 
have proposed alternative answers for a more complete integration throughout the whole 
organization. 
Harris recommends three issues which not only will improve intelligence agencies integra-
tion but can be used to “measure” the level of integration on the Intelligence Community, 
basically, the level of established connectivity between and among the agencies, the level 
of multidisciplinary analysis and the importance given to the individual initiative within the 
structures110.  Other possible solutions have been addressed in repeated occasions, as 
Amy Zegart notes on the work of the various Congress commissions setup to investigate 
failures in the intelligence system: “The need to realign the personnel skill mix and improve 
coordination through temporary tours of duty in other agencies received major attention in 
all but two reports”111.  
Other responses to the historical lack of integration between agencies has been the crea-
tion of committees or centers assigned with specific tasks and which are made up of rep-
resentatives from the whole of the community. Such initiatives as the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) and the fusion community centers have achieved, at best, mixed results. In 
the case of the centers, Michael Turner argues that  
In practice, however, the centers (fusion community centers) have fallen far short 
from being the focal points of all work on an intelligence issue and in exhibiting 
community spirit. One problem has been that numerous other entities within the in-
telligence community duplicate the work of the centers.112 
 
 
For all the literature on the insularity of intelligence agencies and its impact on community 
work, solutions are still far away. Individuals, personalities and relationships continue to be 
a definite factor in the intelligence sharing sphere. But most of the analyses that are found 
in intelligence literature are based on the western intelligence communities, mainly that of 
the United States. As Peter Gill admitted, “the existing literature on security intelligence 
matters in the UK is both less extensive than in North America and, qualitatively, has con-
tributed less to the development of a systematic body of knowledge”113.  
2.7. The Colombian case 
About Colombia, a country with very little research on intelligence matters, the same could 
be said. A brief overview of the existing literature on intelligence gives a good indication, 
as Russell Swenson notes, “Intelligence scholarship on Latin America is barely nascent, 
as reflected in the scant bibliographies for the five countries covered in Brassey’s encyclo-
pedic Yearbook on intelligence services”114. However scant and nascent the literature on 
Colombian intelligence may be, it nonetheless addresses tangently the integration issue. 
Andres Villamizar states that, 
Notwithstanding Colombia has various institutions responsible for the intelligence 
tasks, presently there is no true Intelligence Community, understood as an integral 
system in charge of collation, processing and dissemination of strategic infor-
mation directed towards decision making and public policy formulation regarding 
security and national defence.115  
He goes on to suggest some actions aimed at overcoming the agencies’ insularity; namely 
the creation of a security advisor’s post, under the President’s office, directly responsible 
for the centralization of the intelligence product from all agencies, as well as a clear defini-
tion on the roles and missions of all agencies involved116. Another author who addresses 
the need for integration of the Colombian intelligence agencies is Laude Fernandez, a 
former Head of the Directorate of Intelligence at DAS. During his presentation at a confer-
ence on Colombian security policy, in September 2002, he expressed his concern over the 
lack of coordination between the agencies. In his words, 
Let us first state that the only possibility that intelligence has of working as a tool 
for the security and national defense policies in any country is in the shape of a 
Community [sic], which means that the agencies in this field must come together 
 
 
on the basis of a definition and acceptance of established parameters of admin-
istration, coordination, task distribution and professional standards. 117 
His proposal for improved coordination includes the creation of a National Intelligence 
Council made up of the heads of the intelligence agencies and high level officers from the 
Ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign Relations, Industry and the Treasury, whose Presi-
dent or leader will be responsible for defining the annual intelligence priorities, presenting 
the budget requirements on behalf of all agencies and certifying the competence of the 
nominees for senior posts in the agencies118. Other aspects of his proposal resemble rec-
ommendations that have been issued over time by the U.S. Congress Intelligence Com-
missions, mainly, joint training for all agencies’ recruits on some of the modules and rota-
tion of personnel through the intelligence establishment, both civilian and military119.  
Both of these proposals for improving the intelligence community coordination in Colom-
bia, although valuable in representing a break with the past, limit themselves to changes in 
structures, leaving untouched fundamental aspects such as culture and power struggles. It 
is interesting nevertheless that even though Laude Fernandez’s approach includes the cul-
ture factor as an obstacle to change120, much in the manner of Herbert Simon and Amy 
Zegart121, he does not include this issue in his recommendations. 
Finally, Andres Saenz and Ismael Idrobo, briefly describe how the lack of integration of the 
intelligence agencies affects specific military and police operations, in this case, against 
drug trafficking organizations. In their view,  
The present [intelligence] system promotes rivalry between the services and insti-
tutions and encourages competition to attract attention and resources from the de-
cision makers in this area. The lack of continuity of intelligence personnel in their 
posts and the immediate demand for intelligence – sponsored greatly by the inter-
nal situation in Colombia- has retarded and impeded the improvement through in-
terinstitutional agreements that allow the strengthening of the operational and stra-
tegic intelligence in the higher levels of decision making.122   
The Colombian intelligence community, although scarcely studied, seems to suffer from 
the same problems which confront other more developed nations, such as the United 
States, Canada or France. In what way this intelligence community interacts will be dis-
cussed in the following chapter.  
 
 
CHAPTER 3. COLOMBIA’S INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE 
Colombia has six main intelligence organizations which have evolved in their structure 
over time to serve the nation’s needs. As well as structure, other elements that are some-
times overseen influence the way in which they operate. Intelligence agencies interact with 
each other in a context characterized by a determined organizational culture and within a 
framework of established political power relations. Apart from these elements, Colombian 
intelligence agencies have been heavily influenced by U.S. cooperation in the form of Plan 
Colombia, and by recent scandals about infiltration of paramilitaries in DAS.  
 
Figure 3 describes the current structure of the Colombian intelligence community. A more 
detailed description of the individual agencies’ structure will be found in the appendix.   
3.1. Army Intelligence 
Although intelligence has played a part in army operations since the independence cam-
paign led by Simon Bolivar in the first half of the nineteenth century, it was only after the 
participation of a Colombian contingent, the “Batallon Colombia”, in the Korean War that 
the Colombian Army adopted a move towards a more institutional approach. As Villamizar 
has pointed out,  
Notwithstanding, it’s only after the involvement of Colombia in the Korean War 
(1950-1953) when the true development of intelligence as a professional activity 
begins. The return of this conflict’s veterans initiated the process of consolidating 
the methods, techniques and procedures pertaining to military intelligence. In fact, 
the impact of the Colombian Army’s participation in the Korean War marked a 
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officers, NCOs and soldiers involved in this confrontational stage had the oppor-
tunity to assimilate the most recent technological, doctrinal and strategic advanc-
es. It can be stated that the modern Colombian Army was born after it took part in 
Korea.123 
In Colombia, the military personnel that had been involved in the war shared the experi-
ence they had gathered fighting alongside the United States Army, the most powerful mili-
tary establishment in the world at the time. One of the most complete accounts of the  les-
sons learned was written by Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiz Novoa in 1956, who in his 
book Lessons from the Korean Campaign suggested elements that should be taken from 
the United States Army and adapted into the Colombian Armed Forces, including military 
intelligence124. As a result, and after United States advisors had been sent to train Colom-
bian officers in basic military intelligence in 1962125, in 1963 the first intelligence units were 
deployed in Bogota, Cucuta and Barranquilla, under the direction of the E-2 Army Depart-
ment126. A year later, the newly born military intelligence organization was named  Batallon 
de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia - BINCI (Intelligence and Counterintelligence Batal-
lion)127. 
Although some changes in the military intelligence organization would occur between 1964 
and 1986, mainly the creation of the Army’s Intelligence Directorate, the Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence Command and the Intelligence and Counterintelligence School in 1985 
and the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Brigade (XX Brigade) a year later, it was only 
in 1991 when military intelligence was established as an “arm for combat support”128.  
Presently, the Army’s Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion de Inteligencia - DINTE) is part 
of the Operations Command, along with the Operations and the Integrated Action Direc-
torates, and is composed of a TECHINT and HUMINT sections, as well as open source 
analysts.  
3.2. Air Force Intelligence129 
Intelligence activities within the Colombian Air Force go back to the 1970s and the creation 
of the Aviation Infantry branch within the service. In those days, and in the absence of a 
defined air intelligence doctrine, the Aviation Infantry used the land army’s intelligence 
doctrine, for intelligence in the Air Force was limited to the security of the airfields and the 
air force headquarters. This fact was reinforced by the training of the Aviation Infantry of-
ficers in the Intelligence and Counterintelligence facilities run by the Army. It was not until 
 
 
the 1990s that a proper air intelligence doctrine was established along with an Air Intelli-
gence School to instruct officers in Air Force intelligence, whose main objective is to sup-
port aerial operations.  
Within the Air Force, intelligence has evolved in the internal structure from a Department in 
the 1970s, to a Unit in the 1990s and since January 31, 2002, by Ministerial Resolution 
0068130, to a Command (Jefatura de Inteligencia Aerea), in response to the increasing im-
portance it has gained for the service. Following the single service/all source approach that 
has been predominant in the Colombian Armed Forces, the Air Force Intelligence Com-
mand handles the complete intelligence cycle and also carries out TECHINT, specially 
SIGINT and IMINT operations which are performed in aerial platforms. They also carry out 
HUMINT operations as well as open source analysis for their product, which is used for 
aerial operations against the terrorist organizations and the drug cartels. The Aerial Intelli-
gence Command participates in the Joint Intelligence Committee.  
3.3. Naval Intelligence131 
Until 1991, the Naval General Staff M-2, notwithstanding its advisory role, was in charge of 
guiding and articulating the intelligence requirements in the Colombian Navy, throughout 
the intelligence sections of all Navy structures, from brigades to companies. After 1991, 
and in line with the ongoing changes happening in all intelligence services of the Armed 
Forces, the Naval Directorate of Intelligence was created with a new operational concept 
replacing the old advisory role performed by the late M-2. The Directorate was subordinat-
ed to the Naval Operations Command, where its operational role could be most fully ex-
ploited.  
In 1997, the Directorate of Counter Intelligence, previously one of the Intelligence Deputy 
Directorates, was created with the aim of separating tasks and specializing the knowledge 
over the Navy’s jurisdiction, mainly the oceans and rivers. Five years later, a reform to the 
procedures in the intelligence cycle process was put in place. Before, the intelligence was 
collected throughout the country and was sent to the Navy’s Intelligence Directorate for its 
collation and analysis. Once the product had been terminated, it was disseminated among 
the naval units that required it for their operations. With the reform, intelligence was decen-
tralized and Regional Intelligence Directorates were created to handle the intelligence cy-
cle in a more autonomous way, therefore accelerating the time between the collection and 
 
 
dissemination of intelligence. As with the other services, the Naval Intelligence conducts 
HUMINT, TECHINT and OSINT operations and the whole intelligence cycle.  
Finally, all the changes that had been partially and disorderly happening were incorporated 
in the 2005 Naval Intelligence reform, which under Ministerial Resolution 0305132, March 
17, 2005, gave way to the Naval Intelligence Command and its current structure. With the 
transformation from Directorate to Command level, the organization’s status was en-
hanced and reorganized under the command of a Rear Admiral who controls four Direc-
torates: internal intelligence, counter intelligence, maritime and foreign intelligence, and 
the Naval Intelligence Training School. The structure of the Naval Intelligence Command is 
shown in Chart 3.3. As with the other agencies, it also participates in the JIC. 
The training for the naval intelligence officers was carried out in the Army’s Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence School (Escuela de Inteligencia y Contrainteligencia Charry Sola-
no), until this reform which not only brought about the creation of a specialized Naval Intel-
ligence School, but also, and with the United States Navy cooperation, the creation of a 
naval intelligence doctrine. To complete the process, there is a legislative project that has 
been approved by Congress and is awaiting Presidential sanction, to create the official in-
telligence branch in the Navy.  
3.4. Police Intelligence 
Intelligence activities within the Colombian National Police have been closely linked with 
criminal investigation, as was revealed by the transformation of the F-2, the police intelli-
gence unit in the 1970s, into the Judicial Police and Investigation Directorate (Direccion de 
Policia Judicial e Investigacion - DIJIN) in the 1980s and finally to the Intelligence Direc-
torate of the National Police (Direccion de Inteligencia de la Policia Nacional - DIPOL) in 
1995133. In 1997, by Presidential Decree 2158, September 4, 1997, the nature and struc-
ture of DIPOL was defined. The decree defines its nature as being “The logical and ration-
al process that requires the information in the institutional and governmental decision tak-
ing”134. With regards to the structure, DIPOL is made up of five main areas: public order 
and internal security, electronic intelligence, counterintelligence, technical operations and 
support and services.135 
However, DIPOL is not the only Police agency who deals with intelligence. The Anti-
Kidnapping and Extortion Police Directorate (Direccion Antisecuestro y Extorsion - DIASE) 
created by Ministerial Decree 864, May 15, 1998, is made up of four areas, one of them 
 
 
being the Intelligence Directorate. According to paragraph 4, article 2 of the Decree, this 
Directorate  must, “Coordinate and develop with [DIPOL], the reception, register, analysis, 
systematization and distribution of the information related with the kidnapping and extor-
tion crimes”136. The Decree also tasks the intelligence area of DIASE to  
Direct and guide the search for information carried out by intelligence for the pre-
vention and repression of the kidnapping and extortion crimes...., coordinate the 
exchange of information acquired by this area with own agencies and the other 
State agencies, for the control of kidnapping and extortion crimes..., elaborate in-
formation search plans..., carry out counterintelligence and internal control mis-
sions..., and, deliver in a timely fashion trustworthy intelligence information to the 
Directorate and the Regional Commands, for the planning of operations against 
kidnapping and extortion.137  
The Police intelligence agencies’ structure are shown in Chart 3.2. One feature that stands 
out in the structure of both branches is the replication of signals and imaging processing 
as well as of information processing138. As a direct result of this situation, a duplication of 
duties is most likely to occur, given the fact that both Directorates contain sections that 
deal with TECHINT, HUMINT and OSINT.  
3.5. Security Administrative Department - DAS  
In 1953, during the only lapse of democratic ruling in Colombia (1953-1957), General Gus-
tavo Rojas Pinilla created the Departamento Administrativo del Servicio de Inteligencia de 
Colombia - SIC (Administrative Department of the Colombian Intelligence Service), giving 
birth to “intelligence as a professional activity of the State”139. After a few years, and due to 
the fall of the military regime and the close association between the SIC and the regime, 
the Administration of Alberto Lleras Camargo, the first democratically elected President of 
the Frente Nacional, introduced some changes, the clearest of them being the transfor-
mation of SIC into the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad - DAS (Administrative 
Security Department). The new organization did not establish clear objectives and by the 
1970s it had become, “a changing profile depending on the Director, in an instrument to 
which the governments of the Frente Nacional would come to when the law would not be 
enough to ensure ‘governance’, as well as performing  its role of investigation and judicial 
police”140. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, without a clear institutional objective the DAS 
acquired new tasks. As described by Steven Boraz:   
 
 
The DAS’s intelligence mission is to produce strategic state intelligence to guaran-
tee internal and external state security. It conducts collection, analysis, and opera-
tions, runs human sources, and is responsible for counterintelligence sections. 
DAS is also charged with investigating crimes that threaten state security, such as 
terrorism, kidnapping, drug and human trafficking, and all issues concerning immi-
gration. It is responsible for the personal security of the President and his minis-
ters, and is Colombia’s link to INTERPOL. The DAS employs about 7000 person-
nel (a small number of whom are working specifically on intelligence issues).141 
With such a broad scope of activities, over the years the DAS saw its main task dilute into 
other less important but more pressing assignments. According to Andres Villamizar, 
DAS is the clear example of an organization, which notwithstanding having an ex-
plicit legal mandate, is involved in all kinds of activities distant from its prime task. 
According to the Decree No. 218, 2000, DAS is assigned with the production of 
state intelligence to support the President in policy making and decision taking. 
However, historically, the DAS has not fulfilled this fundamental mission. Instead 
of focusing its activities towards intelligence and specifically against the main 
threats to national security, the DAS dedicates a good share of its efforts to com-
bating all forms of common crime, which despite requiring attention by the State 
do not constitute threats against the national security, as do the insurgency, the  
drug trafficking and the illegal self defence groups.142 
As a result, by January 2006, the DAS concentrated the largest share of its personnel and 
financial resources in VIP protection, criminal investigation and activities other than intelli-
gence and counterintelligence. According to the final report from a Special Commission set 
up to investigate the way DAS was operating, at the beginning of this year, out of a total 
7,039 personnel, approximately 1,319 were dedicated to the protection of VIPs or sensitive 
installations, 2,227 were assigned to criminal investigation and only 819 were attending 
DAS’s main tasks: intelligence and counterintelligence. The same can be said about finan-
cial resources. While only 14 percent of the Department’s budget goes to intelligence and 
counterintelligence activities, nearly 62 percent is distributed among bodyguards, armored 
cars and criminal investigation143.  
As with Police and Military Intelligence, the Department contains branches that deal with 
HUMINT, OSINT and TECHINT, as well as an operations branch. It even contains an Anti-
 
 
Kidnapping Branch which functions under the Operations division, therefore replicating 
tasks that have been placed under the Police’s Directorate for Anti/Kidnapping and Extor-
sion - DIASE. It even serves as the INTERPOL liaison office in Colombia, an uncommon 
practice among other countries who have included the INTERPOL liaison office inside the 
National Police structures.   
However any account of DAS would be incomplete if the latest series of scandals that 
have hit the institution were left out. During the second half of 2005, rumours were spread-
ing about the infiltration of members of the self defence groups and the drug trafficking or-
ganizations into the DAS databases, changing their information and their criminal files. 
This was done with the inside help of DAS personnel, who went as far as alerting mem-
bers of AUC and drug trafficking organizations of operatives being carried out by the Na-
tional Police and the DEA to capture them. This support meant that on various occasions, 
and thanks to the anticipation with which they received the information, the criminals 
evaded the authorities’ operations against them144. An investigation during the second half 
of 2005 was carried out over this affair and as a result DAS members, including the Head 
of the Computer and Technology Systems division, Rafael Garcia, were imprisoned. 
From then on, the situation would only worsen. In November 2005 a scandal broke be-
cause of differences between the Director and Deputy Director of DAS over the handling of 
an internal problem. The President decided to dismiss them both and to appoint Andres 
Peñate, who until then had been working as Defence Viceminister, as the new Director of 
DAS. However, the problems would not stop there. During the first quarter of 2006, Rafael 
Garcia gave some statements to the press in which he claimed the links between DAS and 
the AUC sprang all the way to the top, and involved the Director of DAS, Jorge Noguera 
and other senior officers. Apart from the links to favour the AUC, Garcia accused Noguera 
of plotting against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and of mounting a murder cam-
paign against trade union leaders145.  
Although Peñate has been quick to make deep changes in the institution, its credibility has 
been diminished, as he recognized in a recent interview. According to the Director of DAS, 
“Confidence in the DAS had to be restored, and quickly … We brought in polygraphs, drew 
a risk map, and identified the 500 officials who handled the most sensitive information to 
sit the test”146. He has also introduced changes in the administration of the Department, 
which meant the sacking of five regional Directors and other measures. As he described it, 
“One of the things that most affected the DAS was that appointments and promotions 
 
 
ceased to be based on merit. Rather, people would bring in friends from outside. We are 
strengthening the concept of meritocracy. All but the top three positions are now open to 
competition”147. 
Albeit the efforts put forward to improve DAS image, the underlying problem that affects 
not only the intelligence agencies but also the whole of the Colombian society is the over-
whelming financial power of the narcoterrorist organizations and their corruption potential. 
This has been evidenced for the last thirty years of Colombian history, where the criminal 
organizations have succeeded in infiltrating the executive, judicial and legislative spheres 
in varying degrees.148   
3.6. Financial Information and Analysis Unit - UIAF     
The Colombian Financial Information and Analysis Unit (Unidad de Informacion y Analisis 
Financiero - UIAF) was established in August 1999 following the recommendations made 
by the International Financial Action Task Force in 1989 and the creation of various finan-
cial intelligence units in the 1990s149. Its main objective, as established by Law 526, is to 
“detect, prevent, and in general, fight against asset laundering in all economic activities, 
for which it shall centralize, systematize and analyze all information collected”, from  all fi-
nancial entities and firms that may end up involved with asset laundering operations, 
which “shall be obliged to supply, either on a regular basis or upon request from the Unit, 
all the information the present article deals with”150.  
For its work, the UIAF depends on reports from the financial system, as it has no supervi-
sion powers. It receives the information in the Suspicious Operations Report (Reporte de 
Operaciones Sospechosas – ROSE) format that is generated in all financial institutions as 
well as money exchange agencies and gambling enterprises which may be used for mon-
ey laundering when they suspect of an illicit transaction.  It is this report that initiates the 
investigation which is continued by UIAF and later handed to law enforcement agencies 
151.      
One of the main differences the UIAF has with the other intelligence agencies, is that ac-
cording to its objectives and structure, the Unit does not bear the power to enforce or act 
upon its intelligence. In this sense, it stands apart from DAS, Police and Military Intelli-
gence organizations who, aside from being all source agencies in charge of the whole in-
telligence cycle, possess operations branches which enables them to act on their intelli-
gence. UAIF’s structure, which is described in chart 3.4. consists of three Deputy Direc-
 
 
torates, two of which are in charge of strategic analysis and operational analysis, respec-
tively. The third section deals mainly with administrative issues. This has led to UIAF being 
considered “a real example for the intelligence agencies in Colombia to follow.”152 
This separation of tasks that characterizes UIAF has been part of its success. In dealing 
with money laundering it has established institutional links with the Attorney General’s Of-
fice and judicial police agencies such as the National Police’s DIJIN (Direccion de Policia 
Judicial) and DAS, all of which are assigned to act upon the information they receive from 
the Unit. Witness to this success has been the “open doors” program, an occasion in 
which representatives from other countries visit the Unit to deepen their knowledge on new 
techniques for fighting money laundering and strengthening the ties between financial 
units around the world. In 2005 the second “open doors” forum was held in Bogota with 
the participation of financial units from 19 countries as well as multilateral agencies such 
as the World Bank and the United Nations Latin American Legal Assistance Program153.      
3.7. Joint Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Command - J2154 
With the appointment of Minister of Defence Luis Fernando Ramirez in 1999, the Colombi-
an Armed Forces began a process of transformation from a single service to a joint com-
mand structure, following similar transformations occurring around the world in other 
Armed Forces, specially the United States of America through the Goldwater-Nicholls Act 
for joint operations155. Within this transformation process, intelligence has also been af-
fected, as can be derived from the Minister of Defence’s introduction to the Democratic 
Defence and Security Policy:  
The Security Forces professionalization process will be accompanied by an effort 
to increase coordination and joint work within the Security Forces as well as be-
tween the Security Forces and the States’ judicial and investigative institutions. An 
example of this is the coordination in intelligence. From the beginning of this ad-
ministration the Ministry of Defence has staged joint meetings of the Intelligence 
Directorates of the Armed Forces, National Police, DAS, and the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office. This coordination is already bearing fruits.156 
With this new ‘joint’ vision, the General Staff ‘2’ section was transformed three years ago 
into the Joint Intelligence and Counterintelligence Command, subordinated to the Joint 
Chief of Staff. Its task is to articulate and coordinate the operations of the Army, Navy and 
Air Force intelligence services, through the Joint Intelligence Center, a tri-service division 
 
 
of J-2, which ensures that the Directives instructed by J-2 are effectively followed. The 
Joint Intelligence Command, as opposed to the single service intelligence commands, has 
no operational role, and therefore only works with strategic intelligence in an advisory role. 
Its structure is divided into four Directorates: external intelligence, counter intelligence, 
administrative resources and the Joint Intelligence Center (Centro de Inteligencia Conjunta 
- CIC), which as has already been mentioned, ensures that the information flows smoothly 
between the Joint Command and the single service’s intelligence staffs.  
3.8. Joint Intelligence Committee - JIC 
Realizing the need for a more integrated approach from the Colombian intelligence agen-
cies, in 1995, President Ernesto Samper issued Decree 2233 by which the National Intelli-
gence System (Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia - SINAI) and the National Intelligence 
Technical Council (Consejo Tecnico Nacional de Inteligencia) were created157. The Decree 
alluded to intelligence as “a Government’s task whose objective is to serve as a tool in the 
decision making process of the state, and in consequence, contributes to safeguard the 
peace and security of the Nation”158, and established the creation of the SINAI on the ba-
sis of the need to develop “an integrated and coordinated mechanism between the various 
governmental entities entrusted by the juridical order to carry out this task [intelligence]159. 
Unfortunately this effort would fail, and after less than six meetings during 1996160 it would 
never meet again. According to Laudo Fernandez, a former Director of Intelligence at 
DAS, the SINAI did not work, among other reasons, because “there was no political will to 
enforce its mandate, there was a lack of interest of the agencies in working as a communi-
ty, and the Decree was issued without an open debate among the intelligence agencies 
over its content”161. However arguable these reasons for failure may seem, the fact that 
the administration of Ernesto Samper was more worried about being able to stay in power 
rather than to govern, did not give the SINAI much chance of survival162. 
The next opportunity to revive such a space for the integration of the intelligence agencies 
would not come until the Uribe administration. In 2002, and after being elected President 
of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe requested assistance in intelligence matters from the United 
Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair. As a result, a British advisor was sent to work with 
the Colombian intelligence agencies in the creation of a Joint Intelligence Committee (Jun-
ta de Inteligencia Conjunta - JIC) which would serve as a “space for intelligence coordina-
tion and to develop the Democratic Defence and Security Policy’s mandate”163. Although 
 
 
the JIC has been a step in the right direction, as can be seen in the consistency and fre-
quency of the meetings since its inception (every two weeks since its inception under the 
leadership of the Viceminister of Defence and the J-2 Chief), it does not yet have a legal 
basis, much in the same way as many other of the intelligence agencie’s activities in the 
country.   
Notwithstanding the above, the four main objectives of the JIC, “To elaborate unified re-
ports and recommendations on issued which facilitate the strategic decision making pro-
cess in security matters for the National Government, propose policies in intelligence mat-
ters, translate into intelligence requirements the Government’s security policies and serve 
as a coordination space for information sharing on terrorist attacks” have proved useful so 
far164.  
3.9. Plan Colombia 
Throughout the consolidation of the military intelligence organization, the influence of the 
United States has been felt all along. From the special advisors sent to train the Colombi-
an Army in basic military intelligence in 1962, to the intelligence mission that made some 
recommendations to the Gaviria administration for the 1991 intelligence reform, to the very 
recent Plan Colombia projects which have boosted the military capabilities, the U.S. weight 
can be seen in the Colombian military in general, and more specifically in the intelligence 
community. 
Although resources from the United States for the Colombian authorities had been flowing 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the U.S. Government delivered aid to the Co-
lombian National Police’s efforts in eradicating marijuana crops from the Sierra Nevada de 
Santa Marta and the Llanos Orientales regions165, it was only with the entry into force of 
the so called Plan Colombia that a bilateral coherent and planned strategy was set in 
place. According to the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion (National Planning De-
partment – DNP), Plan Colombia 
Is a bilateral cooperation integral strategy, whose general objective is to combat 
the illicit drugs and organized crime, therefore contributing to economic reactiva-
tion and the achievement of peace in Colombia. This agreement is based on the 
shared responsibility principle, which recognizes that the world drug problem is a 
common responsibility shared by the international community that demands an in-
tegral and balanced vision to confront the supply and demand of illicit drugs. Fur-
 
 
thermore, Plan Colombia encourages the efforts and the results achieved by Co-
lombia in its fight against the world’s drug problem. 
Likewise, Plan Colombia is designed to strengthen the State and Colombian society to 
overcome the narcoterrorist threat, within a context of strengthening  the democracy 
and human rights, while at the same time improving the economic and social condi-
tions of the most vulnerable population.166 
According to figures from DNP and the Defence Ministry, during the period 1999-2005, the 
United States has put into Plan Colombia nearly US$ 3,780 million of which around 85 
percent was destined to either the institutional strengthening or the fight against illicit drugs 
programs. It is as part of these programs that the Colombian intelligence community has 
received resources and funding for various projects, the most important being the acquisi-
tion of intelligence aerial platforms for communications interception for the National Police, 
the Air Force, and the Navy. The Army has also received aerial platforms for intelligence 
collection, but these have been acquired with their own resources. In practice this means 
that all three services and the National Police maintain the capability to work TECHINT 
with the help, in most cases, of the United States Government. 
Although the aid received from Plan Colombia has boosted military and police capacity to 
levels which would not have been possible otherwise, new channels have opened for the 
Police and Armed Forces leaders to overcome the lack of resources and funding from the 
Colombian Government, a clear case being the aid provided during the late 1990s decade 
to General Rosso Jose Serrano, Director of Colombia’s National Police167. This practice 
has undermined the planning processes that result from a well defined national intelli-
gence policy.  
In as much as the Armed Forces chiefs can obtain resources outside which they are de-
nied locally, not only are policies ineffective, but also, as pointed out by Nicole Ball, “de-
spite considerable rhetoric about ‘empowerment’ and ‘ownership’ donor agencies and their 
representatives frequently insist on defining what is to be done, how is it to be done, and 
who is to do it168. This practice has introduced a high level of distortion to the intelligence 
community. In the event a requirement arises, Plan Colombia gives incentives for acquir-
ing new resources as opposed to looking for institutionalized and cooperative solutions. 
This is clearly one of the issues to be addressed if, as Mark Joyce states, “The levels of 
 
 
political investment in Plan Colombia, both in Washington and Bogotá, are sufficiently high 










CHAPTER 4. THE COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY:  
THE PRACTICE 
“If community (sic) is taken to mean a large organization with common goals, 
purposes, and direction, then the phrase Intelligence Community (sic) is, in fact, 
an oxymoron”170. Even though this phrase refers to the United States Intelligence 
Community, its significance could well be applied to other countries’ Intelligence 
Communities, including Colombia’s. Many factors have affected the evolution of 
the Colombian intelligence agencies for, as has been noticed, they “were created 
and developed like most bureaucracies throughout history – haphazardly, inde-
pendently, competitively and awkwardly”171. 
 
In this sense, the present chapter will attempt to give a more detailed picture of 
how the Colombian intelligence agencies interact and how they are moving to-
wards greater integration, following the path set out by the Democratic Defence 
and Security Policy. In setting out its objectives, the policy underlines the need 
for “promoting all measures which contribute to the intelligence integration, such 
as the horizontal exchange of information between agencies, the confidence 
building through the safe use of information, the responsible protection of 
sources and the joint release of operational successes”172.  
4.1. Intelligence Community? 
Perhaps the most vivid description of the evolution of the Colombian intelligence 
agencies is expressed by the former Viceminister of Defence, Andres Peñate, 
the Defence Minister’s delegate to the JIC, and the current Director of DAS. In 
his words,  
 
Before [1990 and the Gaviria Administration], the debate was about the 
need to play music and not having the right musical instruments; today, 
we have excellent instruments and people that know how to play them 





This lack of an integrated intelligence community is reflected in the lack of a 
structure oriented towards the close interaction between the various intelligence 
agencies. Not one agency within the Armed Forces, the National Police agen-
cies, DAS or UIAF, includes in its organizational structure a direct link to the JIC, 
the only entity created with the specific purpose of intelligence integration. This 
situation is worsened by the fact that other than its mention in the Democratic 
Defence and Security Policy174, and notwithstanding various efforts at formalizing 
its existence175, the JIC experiment in Colombia still lacks a legal framework to 
exist and in which to operate. In practice this means that the only integration 
channel for the intelligence community as a whole does not exist by law. There-
fore, the intelligence community structure is missing a formal workplace to which 
all agencies can relate to and interact in as an effective community. 
4.2. Problems with structure: our lack of external eyes 
Other problems arise from the current structure, none more obvious than the ab-
sence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another legitimate user and producer of 
external policy and information. Colombia, as any other country within the inter-
national community has foreign interests176. To address those interests, the gov-
ernment must collect and produce intelligence in order to take informed deci-
sions. As the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces has 
noted,  
 
The mission of foreign intelligence is to obtain, correlate and evaluate in-
telligence relevant to external security and for warning purposes. 
Maintenance of external security requires knowledge of the threats, dan-
gers, and risks as well as of the opportunities and likelihood of events 
and outcomes up to aggressions. Hence, information is needed about in-
tentions, capabilities and activities of foreign powers, organizations, 
groups or persons and their agents that represent actual or potential 




However, in Colombia there is no institutional relation between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the intelligence community. The Ministry does not contribute 
to the only intelligence interagency body, the JIC, and has no institutional contact 
in any way with the individual intelligence agencies. In this sense, and as the Di-
rector of DAS stated when interviewed by the autor, Colombia is lacking “capabil-
ities to collect intelligence about the threats faced by Colombian interests further 
away from our borders”.178     
 
Jaramillo has pointed out that, “Colombia, like the other countries of the continent 
– with the exception of Cuba - has never had the type of foreign policy interests 
to justify a real international intelligence service”179. However, without the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs as an intelligence consumer and a source of foreign infor-
mation, there is no legitimate demand for external intelligence, and consequently 
it can be assumed that strategic decisions on external affairs are taken without 
the best possible information available. This separation between a potential con-
sumer and the producer of intelligence is a result both of the absence of an intel-
ligence product that is useful to the potential consumer, and of the lack of 
knowledge from the potential consumer of what the intelligence product can help 
him achieve180. 
 
The current structure not only keeps other entities with clear interest in the intelli-
gence product outside the intelligence community, but also challenges further in-
tegration. As is clear from the previous chapter, the organizational structures of 
the intelligence agencies were not created with their integration within the intelli-
gence community in mind. Even agencies within one organization, such as the 
Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence structures, which are presumed to come 
together under J-2, are not working as close as they should be. In this sense, alt-
hough the intelligence cycle is working properly inside the agencies, various prin-
ciples have been neglected, namely the tasking process and the availability of 
the information for decision makers.    
 
 
4.3. The Armed Forces 
In theory, the creation of the Joint Intelligence and Counterintelligence Command 
was based on the need to “integrate the areas of intelligence and counterintelli-
gence of all services” and to serve as the “directive and guiding body for all intel-
ligence commands”181. In practice it works differently. Even though J-2 is ex-
pected to serve as the “directive and guiding body” of military intelligence, a mis-
sion for which control of tasking is required, the Army, Air Force and Navy Com-
manders also rely on their service intelligence commands for their own intelli-
gence needs. The service Commander’s intelligence requirements, for which 
they obviously task their service intelligence units, do not necessarily match 
those of the J-2, creating a friction that will be felt by the service Intelligence Di-
rectorate Chiefs. While in practice they owes their allegiance, the resources they 
receive, and their future career to the Army, Air Force or Navy Chief Command-
er, in theory they are expected to work under the guidance of and for the ‘benefit’ 
of the Joint Command.  
On the other hand, J-2 has been left almost an exclusive advisory role, leaving 
the intelligence operations to the services. The J-2 is dependent for the collection 
and collation stages of the intelligence cycle on the single service intelligence 
agencies. The only exception to this rule are the jurisdictions covered by Joint 
Commands and Joint Task Forces, which presently represent a minimal fraction 
of the territory182. In these cases, Joint Commands and Joint Task Forces deliver 
the collected information straight to the J-2 analysis unit, the CIC. For the rest of 
the jurisdictions, which in practical terms means most of the country’s territory, 
Army, Air Force and Navy intelligence services deliver the collected information 
to their analysis units and only later is the information they deem necessary dis-
seminated to the J-2.  
Discussing about a similar situation, Taylor and Goldman argue that in the United 
States Intelligence Community, 
 
 
No significant improvement will occur until the DCI (Director of Central In-
telligence) is actually given some kind of personnel and budgetary au-
thorities over all Intelligence Community entities. No bureaucracy will 
have the desired coordination and unity if the putative director of that 
community lacks control over the career advancement and salaries of 
those he or she needs to coordinate.183 
Another difficulty that arises from this current arrangement within the Armed 
Forces intelligence agencies stems from the differences in hierarchy both in the 
positions within the structure, and the officers appointed to them. While in the Air 
Force and Navy structure, the intelligence units are subordinate to the Second 
Commander, and headed respectively by a Brigadier General and a Rear Admi-
ral, in the Army structure the intelligence Directorate is subordinate to the Opera-
tions Command. Presently, J-2, itself a Command, is headed by an Air Force 
Brigadier General, who might have difficulties in tasking and directing officers 
who might be senior to him or who feel their service has more to offer.  
This feeling pervades throughout the Army, as being the oldest and largest ser-
vice, it has been known to underestimate other services and contradict their 
views. Such proved to be the case in April 2005 when the President sacked four 
high ranking Generals, including the Army’s Second Commander and the Inspec-
tor General, who publicly expressed their disagreement with the Defence Minister 
and the Joint Chief of Staff, over the creation of Joint Commands in some re-
gions. In their opinion, the joint command policy was mistaken and would crum-
ble the Army’s unity, taking into account it was the largest service, with around 
220,000 members, and the leading force in the fight against the terrorist organi-
zations184.     
A final problem within the Armed Forces intelligence services comes from differ-
ent visions that have resulted from their doctrine, training and orientation. Even 
though in the 1960s and 1970s, with the creation of intelligence first in the Army 
and then in the Air Force and the Navy, there was only one doctrine and one 
 
 
training school attended by all three services, over the years, and as described in 
the previous chapter, this has changed. Presently the three services not only 
have different doctrines but also separate training facilities, which in turn lead to 
differences in intelligence practices.  
From interviews carried out with members of the Armed Forces intelligence ser-
vices, the understanding of their role and of intelligence concepts is uneven. It 
seems that in the Navy concepts such as strategic, operational and tactical intel-
ligence are very similar to those found in western intelligence literature. This is 
probably because of the recent creation of the naval intelligence school and the 
fact that it has been influenced largely by the United States Navy in both its doc-
trine and training. However, the Air Force and the Army or J-2 seemed to have 
different, although not contradictory understandings.      
4.4. The National Police  
In the National Police, the DIPOL is clearly empowered as the guiding body of 
intelligence within the National Police. According to General Chavez, head of 
DIPOL,  
At the Executive Level Police Intelligence Committee, which meets with 
the intelligence units from the Anti-kidnapping and Extorsion Directorate 
– DIASE, the Antinarcotics Directorate (Direccion Antinarcoticos – 
DIRAN), and the Road Police Directorate (Direccion de Policia de Car-
reteras) every 15 days, upon convocation of DIPOL, we generate the 
doctrine, training and intelligence operation guidance. At the Directive 
Level Police Intelligence Committee, which holds meetings every month 
with all the Operational Directorates’ heads, we generate intelligence pol-
icy for the National Police Operational Directorates.185 
In this sense, the DIPOL exercises effective leadership over intelligence within 
the National Police, even though it neither controls  does not control nor central-
izes the intelligence activities, which are an inherent part of each operational Di-
rectorate. On the other hand, and in similar circumstances to the Colombian Na-
 
 
vy, the National Police has had an important influence from the United States 
Government over the years. As Michael Kenney rightly notes,  
 
Washington and Bogotá entered into a series of agreements in which the 
U.S. provided substantial material and symbolic assistance to reform ex-
isting institutions and create new ones, including specially trained en-
forcement and investigative units…prominent among these efforts was 
the computerization of law enforcement intelligence collection, analysis, 
and dissemination systems, the creation of a new CNP (Colombian Na-
tional Police) Directorate for Intelligence (DIPOL) in 1995, and the con-
struction of a state-of-the-art Central de Inteligencia Politica to support 
DIPOL programs three years later.186 
As with the other intelligence agencies, DIPOL lacks any formal links in its struc-
ture to the JIC. This situation stems in part because of the lack of JIC legislation, 
but also from the lack of clarity in the assignments of roles and missions 
throughout the wider security community. For General Chavez, DIPOL’s Director, 
this confusion over who does what is one of the main obstacles to further integra-
tion.187  
 
4.5. The Ministry of Defence 
Even though the Ministry of Defence does not have an intelligence structure, it is 
one of the most important organizations within the intelligence community puzzle 
as it controls the Armed Forces and National Police, and therefore the whole of 
those institution’s intelligence agencies. In fact, the JIC was an initiative launched 
by the Minister of Defence, after the British Government had agreed to cooperate 
with Colombia on a request by President Uribe, as explained in chapter 3. For 
this reason the JIC is headed by the Minister of Defence or his representative, 
and attended by the heads of the other intelligence units belonging to the Armed 
Forces and the National Police, as well as DAS and UIAF.  
 
 
Other schemes have been launched by the Ministry of Defence in its aim to im-
prove the intelligence product through a deeper integration of the intelligence 
agencies. Plan Cancerbero is an operation to eliminate or apprehend high value 
targets, where National Police and Armed Forces intelligence chiefs meet with 
the Minister of Defence to gather information and eliminate undesirable com-
partmentation of the intelligence between the agencies. Civilian intelligence 
agencies do not participate in this operation which is presently assigned to an 
Army Brigadier General, who is directly responsible to the Minister of Defence.  
Success of JIC and Plan Cancerbero is mixed. For former Defence Minister 
Jorge Alberto Uribe, the cultural factor that inhibits the Armed Forces to integrate 
better is deeply entrenched and not easily overcome. As the Minister described, 
intelligence concealing among the Armed Forces and National Police was such 
that to keep information from others attendants to Plan Cancerbero meetings 
would share unimportant information during the gathering, and privately report to 
the Minister any valuable intelligence they had collected188. Some of these issues 
have been overcome by sheer insistence on the part of Ministers Uribe and more 
recently Ospina, who have made an effort in making sure whatever intelligence is 
given to them is shared between the agencies.  
 
The results have borne fruit. For General Chavez, from DIPOL, the methodology 
used for Plan Cancerbero is becoming more useful, as officers are not allowed to 
approach the Minister privately. Even if they try to, because of the Minister’s 
compromise with intelligence sharing, such an action will be considered wrong. In 
his words,  
Cancerbero was working at 2 per cent of its potential [at the start], but 
now we’re working at 60 per cent of our capability. If we have not cap-
tured a high value target its not because of intelligence, but because 
some things have gone wrong during the operations189 
Two issues arise from this experience. First of all, despite Minister Uribe’s disap-
 
 
pointment with Cancerbero’s results, it was a move in the right direction and his 
perseverance and that of Minister Ospina have resulted in a scheme that is be-
ginning to be appreciated by all involved. Time has been of the essence. Second, 
joint task forces or committees have a room among the Colombian intelligence 
community, notwithstanding an organizational aversion to their creation. In An-
dres Peñate’s words, “there is a cultural feature we are missing here, which is 
somewhat the formal Governmental procedures in committees and councils, be-
cause that is not the way we work over here”190. Infiltration enforces this isolation 
culture. Because shared information can all to easily be leaked, compromising 
sources and methods and leading to intelligence failure, there is no incentive to-
wards cooperation and information sharing. Given the corruption and bribery al 
too prevalent during the era of the cocaine wars, the final balance has yet to be 
assessed. 
But other issues remain. The lack of a body where intelligence consumers and 
producers other than the Armed Forces and the National Police interact regularly 
in defining the intelligence requirements and the tasking and collection priorities 
have meant that intelligence has been used, mainly for tactical and operational 
purposes against drug trafficking organizations and terrorist groups. Intelligence 
for strategic state purposes is close to nonexistent. This was reflected in the 
shaping of the Democratic Defence and Security Policy that embodies the key 
national security issues affecting Colombia, which did not even require the intelli-
gence community’s views. In Sergio Jaramillo’s words, responsible at the time for 
the policy, “Basically, what we did was take the policy guidelines President Uribe 
had drawn since his campaign, and by the Defence Minister’s initiative, transform 
them into a policy we expect to be coherent, from the state and that dictates the 
whole government’s security effort”191.   
 The JIC experience has not been the solution. Although in the beginning it was 
expected to become the bridge between the decision - making bodies and the 
intelligence community, this never materialized. The Colombian Government has 
not yet found a proper scenario for the interaction between intelligence producers 
 
 
and consumers where strategic intelligence requirements are tasked and the re-
sults are disseminated in an all-source community backed product.  
The Security Councils where the President, Minister of Defence, heads of the 
Armed Forces and National Police and the Director of DAS meet, have not be-
come such a place either. One interviewee mentioned the ground that the intelli-
gence is losing before the decision maker’s eyes, because of the way intelligence 
is disseminated. In those Security Councils, the head of every Armed Force is 
expected to have and share the information its service has collected, something 
that is neither possible nor desirable. In the end, the service commander is not 
responsible for the intelligence section. There is also no evidence that the intelli-
gence reports are acted upon by the intelligence consumers for either taking ac-
tions or making decisions.   
The JIC has also shown that joint meetings are not enough. Even though sharing 
information is a good start, the intelligence agencies still duplicate efforts and un-
derutilize resources. The Director of DAS exposed a clear example when he ex-
plained how in this year’s budget both DAS and Army intelligence were investing 
resources in acquiring or improving satellite communications interception. This is 
replicated all over the Armed Forces and National Police, where intelligence ca-
pabilities have been designed as almost perfect substitutes, where complemen-
tarities are scarce.  
There have also been other lessons. It is quite common to adhere to some policy 
because everyone does. As Johnson reminds us, “according to an expert on or-
ganizational behaviour, this tendency to get along with others and go along with 
the system is preferred [in all government bureaucracies]”192. Such is the case 
with jointness. Unfortunately, and even though there seems to be a clear objec-
tive, there is no clear end result on sight. JIC has shed some light into how a real 
community should work, and how it should look193. As with Cancerbero,  JIC has 
shown the importance of the time factor in the creation of an effective community 
and the possibilities that interagency task forces have when designed with a spe-
 
 
cific purpose. Unfortunately, JIC suffers from a lack of direction from the intelli-
gence consumer level, creating a disconnect with the intelligence producer level.  
4.6. Financial Information and Analysis Unit - UIAF 
Even though UIAF has been claimed as “one of the best institutions of its kind in 
the region”194 and an example to be followed by the other Colombian agen-
cies195, the financial intelligence service’s role within the intelligence community 
is not as definitive as it seems. By law196, UIAF cannot share its information, in-
formation that in turn it receives from financial institutions and other enterprises 
which can be used for money laundering purposes. As was mentioned earlier, 
UIAF has no supervisory role, a condition which has been explicitly sought by its 
former Director General197. In this sense, the role of UIAF, however fundamental, 
is limited to the collection of a report which is delivered by a financial institution or 
required enterprise in the event of suspected anomalies in financial transactions. 
In case UIAF analysts believe the transaction involves illicit operations, UIAF can 
request further information from the entity that issued the report, which can then 
be stored or passed on to the Attorney General’s Office, the DAS or DIJIN so that 
they can initiate a judicial investigation. The proofs collected by UIAF do not con-
stitute valid evidence in a Colombian court.198 
Accordingly, UIAF cannot share information from the cases it handles unless 
there is an open investigation or a known criminal is involved. It cannot start an 
investigation on a prospective terrorist, because of the lack of a supervisory role, 
and it cannot share its findings in the JIC, where it holds a seat, not least be-
cause the JIC has no legal framework. Even if it had one, UIAF’s interaction with 
other intelligence agencies would be limited by the fact that it can only share in-
formation after an investigation has been opened, a decision that is taken by 
DAS, DIJIN or the Attorney’s Office. Bearing in mind that DAS and DIJIN partici-
pate in JIC, there is no information UIAF can share that is not already in the 
hands of other members of JIC.199    
 
 
4.7. Security Administrative Department - DAS 
Since the scandals over AUC infiltration in DAS were exposed to the public by 
the press in September 2005 and April 2006, much has been debated over the 
future of the agency. According to Decree No. 634, 2004, DAS is responsible 
firstly, for the “production of the State intelligence required by the National Gov-
ernment and of formulating policies in intelligence matters to guarantee the inter-
nal and external national security of the Colombian State”200 and of “guiding the 
strategic intelligence activity of the State in the internal and external fronts” 201. 
Unfortunately, many factors have eroded this capacity. These include the lack of 
interest in the intelligence product, a diluting of its main task due to other more 
pressing but less important assignments202 and the lack of trust generated by the 
infiltration scandals in which it has been enmeshed. 
Today, DAS can be found to provide protection to threatened individuals in Co-
lombia, acting as judicial police, serving as the INTERPOL liaison office, and 
even carrying operations against terrorist organizations. Indeed, in an unfortu-
nate operation against a FARC leader, on April 20, 2006, ten DAS agents were 
ambushed along with six other Army members by FARC in what resulted in the 
biggest setback for the institution since its inception. This incident occurred one 
and a half months after a Commission that had been created by the President to 
evaluate the critical situation in DAS, had proposed that the institution should 
“redefine its action plan and focus its intervention efforts in the production of stra-
tegic intelligence and the development of counterintelligence activities, in such a 
way that its other tasks have a direct and complementary relation with its princi-
pal mission”203.  
Fortunately for DAS, its current Director, Andres Peñate, has the backing of the 
President, the knowledge of how things work within the intelligence community 
and the desire for change. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Peñate is 
introducing 'corporate-style' reforms intended to return the DAS to its 'core busi-
ness' of intelligence and terrorism prevention”204. 
 
 
However, DAS’s troubles lie not only within the institution, but also in the ab-
sence of effective intelligence consumers. When asked about the factors that at-
tempted against intelligence integration, Mr. Peñate stated,  
We are missing the system, a system that pairs supply with demand. As I 
said before, now we have good instruments but we need to write a piece 
that suits the taste of the audience, and the audience must know that the 
music can help them.205 
The system Peñate talks about, and the one he refers to as the musical piece, is 
what he has termed the National Intelligence Plan (Plan Nacional de Inteligen-
cia), a scheme designed by the intelligence community based on the needs of 
the consumers that determines the assignments each intelligence agency will be 
responsible for206. For the moment there is no such plan. Therefore, intelligence 
consumers do not know what to expect from intelligence agencies. In this sense, 
one interviewee related how Ministers and high government officials only address 
the Director of an institution which is responsible for the country’s strategic intelli-
gence to request armoured cars, help with the expedition of the judicial back-
ground certificate, or the DAS VIP room in the airport departure lounge207.  
On the other hand, DAS mixes investigation and intelligence, two tasks that have 
been separated in western countries between the Law Enforcement Agencies 
and the Intelligence Agencies. Such a division, it is argued, stems from different 
requirements in training, resources and goals. As Shulsky points out, “in general, 
very little law enforcement activity is devoted to preventing crime (except by de-
terrence) as opposed to detecting it afterwards and apprehending the perpetra-
tors”208. 
However, terrorism has begun a slight shift in that trend, because “the secret of 
winning the battle against terrorism in an open democratic society is winning the 
intelligence war”209. As terrorism becomes local, intelligence agencies are forced 
to create partnerships with the law enforcement agencies. In a recent report by 
the Rand Corporation, the law enforcement agencies’ support to traditional intel-
 
 
ligence was highlighted because “the evidence gathering can support traditional 
intelligence activities… and the law enforcement agencies’ work may result in 
prosecutions, which in turn disrupt or prevent planned terrorist activities”210. This 
is a role for DAS in Colombia has played: linking the judicial authorities with intel-
ligence agencies. 
Similar experiences are found in the city of Los Angeles211 and in France212, with 
only one main difference: in both cases, as opposed to Colombia, there is a 
transparent and clear legal framework for intelligence to work in. Not only is there 
a legal framework, but also, judicial guidelines to support counterterrorism opera-
tions. In the case of the Los Angeles Police Department, those guidelines allow 
counterterrorism investigations to open not on a “probable cause”, but on a “rea-
sonable suspicion”213. For France, and because of the terrorist threat it faced dur-
ing the 1990s,  
 
This refinement in the law [codify conspiracy to commit or participate with 
the view to the preparation of any act of terrorism itself as terrorism] al-
lowed the investigating magistrates to open investigations and to deploy 
their expertise and judicial tools before terrorist attacks took place, 
thereby enhancing their competence not just for punishing terrorist at-
tacks, but also for preventing them in the first place.214 
This refinement has not yet been implemented in Colombia. 
Notwithstanding all the problems the DAS is presently facing, the fact that a Spe-
cial Presidential Commission was setup to evaluate and propose solutions to the 
crisis is an important first step. For however accurate the Commission’s recom-
mendations have been, and judging by Sergio Jaramillo’s criticisms they will not 
be very useful, the Commission’s work has at least initiated an internal debate 
within DAS over what its role and mission inside the intelligence community 
should be. In Andres Peñate’s words, “the Special DAS Commission gave some 
 
 
recommendations but also generated an important discussion process within 







CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Perhaps the most noticeable of the conclusions, an issue that deserves wide recognition, 
is the effort that has been undertaken in the last ten years by all the intelligence agencies 
towards a more professional and able community. Although the processes have initiated at 
different moments and with different intensities among them, the evolution process in 
which the agencies are involved and the level of professionalism that characterizes them 
presently has been evident all along.  
Part of this professionalism is revealed in their utmost respect for democracy and the 
democratic values for which the Republic of Colombia stands. Even under the special situ-
ation in Colombia, due to the conflict generated by terrorism and drug trafficking, the Co-
lombian intelligence agencies have maintained, albeit individual and isolated cases, a 
clear focus on what their task should be. For this they deserve the nation’s respect. 
5.1. Strengths 
5.1.1. Tactical and Operational Intelligence Capabilities 
Although the intelligence community possesses great strengths, none other matches its 
human resource. Men and women who over the years, and by confronting an adverse in-
ternal situation where terror and crime have converged, have acquired important tactical 
and operational capabilities that have translated into a significant skill to disrupt drug traf-
ficking cartels as well as terrorist organizations.  
This development of intelligence know-how has been extremely important in confronting 
the internal security problems posed by terrorism and illicit drugs, for the consequences of 
operational and tactical actions often result in strategic outcomes. The tactical and opera-
tional intelligence capabilities of the Colombian intelligence agencies have grown into one 
of their main strengths, something that has been greatly influenced by the demands of the 
internal situation.  
5.1.2. Increased Organizational Importance 
Years of developing HUMINT, TECHINT and OPINT methods and sources and improving 
the overall capacity have increased the intelligence agencies’ relative importance within 
 
 
their organizations. Such has been the case of the intelligence units in the Armed Forces 
and National Police, which started out as small departments back in the 1970s and since 
have transformed, with the exception of the Army, into operational commands, overcoming 
a traditional support role, and assuming responsibility for the creation of doctrine, training 
and operations.  
5.1.3. Integration of Intelligence and Investigation 
It is the Colombian internal situation, which questions the traditional strict separation of in-
telligence and law enforcement activities, that has largely influenced the evolution of its 
intelligence community and its present day structure, and has resulted in tailor-made solu-
tions for overcoming the difficulties posed by an internal enemy. This can be especially 
seen in the work carried out by DAS, which enjoys a privileged position both as the link 
connecting the judicial and intelligence areas, and as the entity responsible for creating a 
smooth conduit between the bodies involved in producing intelligence and those acting 
upon it, both in terms of operations and prosecution. 
5.1.4. Internal Recognition of Integration Gains  
The Colombian intelligence community has recognized the need for better integration 
among themselves in order to accomplish improved results. This recognition is borne out 
of the initial experiments that have been carried out within the Colombian intelligence 
agencies such as the JIC, the CIC and Plan Cancerbero. The outcomes that have resulted 
from these schemes have strengthened the confidence of the Armed Forces, National Po-
lice, DAS and UIAF, in the gains achieved by increased integration.  
5.1.5. International Cooperation 
In this effort, international cooperation from countries with a well-deserved tradition in intel-
ligence, such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom, have been crucial. 
Although as has been described in Chapter 2, no system is perfect and both of these intel-
ligence communities are constantly under criticism from various standpoints, cooperation 
projects such as the Colombian adaptation of the JIC experience and the strengthening of 
the Navy’s Intelligence Command provided by the United States, among others, guaran-
tees not only a level of competence but also a high degree of respect for democratic val-




However, all is not good. Serious weaknesses undermine the transformation from a group 
of separate intelligence agencies to an effective integral intelligence community  
5.2.1. Disrupted Communications at the Strategic Level 
To begin with, at the strategic level there is a wide gap separating the intelligence con-
sumers and the producers. The lack of a national intelligence plan is a visible conse-
quence. As Andres Peñate, Director of DAS, stated,  
There is no system to couple demand and supply at the strategic level. The inex-
istence of such a link has meant that the intelligence community’s role in the gov-
ernment apparatus has been limited to the tactical and operational levels against 
the criminal enterprises, actionable intelligence as some may call it, but very little 
or no work at all has addressed long term, strategic issues affecting the State.216  
This situation has worsened over the years because of both a deficiency in the intelligence 
agencies to let their real significance be known to the intelligence consumers, and at the 
same time, a deficiency on the part of the intelligence consumers who have not expressed 
an interest in developing links with intelligence, a fundamental tool for their decision mak-
ing process. This has clearly been the case with the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
an institution that is entirely detached from the intelligence community. 
5.2.2. Distorted Roles and Missions 
Another element affecting the intelligence agencies is the way in which the State’s security 
apparatus has confronted the internal enemy over the last 20 years. In doing so, the 
Armed Forces, the National Police and DAS have lost their original identities and their 
roles and missions have been confused. Today, the police engage in military activity just 
as the military do with police work. A case in point was described in Chapter 4, when in an 
unfortunate event, ten DAS members and six Army soldiers were ambushed by FARC 
when they attempted to conduct an operation against some members of that terrorist or-
ganization.  
In this confusion, incentives have arisen for single services to acquire all source intelli-
gence sufficiency, which is reflected in today’s duplication of resources and intelligence 
structures. The Armed Forces, the National Police and DAS have almost replicated their 
intelligence structures, which means that in practice they all have comparable capabilities 
 
 
in HUMINT and TECHINT, as well as collation, analysis and dissemination capacities. Be-
cause there is no specialization, every agency can produce a single, self-sufficient intelli-
gence product, which reaches the intelligence consumer without being tested for common 
mistakes such as mirror imaging or circular intelligence.  
5.2.3. Duplication  
Specialization is also sought for decreasing the waste of efforts and resources through 
duplication, the unhealthy competition that arises between the agencies, and the com-
partmentation of the information. Furthermore, the duplication has eliminated any incentive 
to integrate the intelligence capabilities. If every agency can run the whole spectrum of 
methods and sources, collation, analysis and dissemination, little is going to be gained out 
of stronger links and cooperation.  
5.2.4. Cooperation-led Distortion 
This situation has been worsened by the lack of clear international cooperation channels 
and procedures, especially with regards to Plan Colombia. As was mentioned in Chapter 
3, Plan Colombia has boosted the Colombian military and police capabilities. Unfortunate-
ly, the down side of this has been the way this cooperation has at some points been used 
by different people to “jump over” legal, planning or resource restrictions. As a result, in-
centives have since appeared for further isolation between the agencies.    
5.2.5. Demand for Immediate Results 
The demand for immediate results has also weakened the intelligence integration process. 
Immediate results, fed from short term, actionable intelligence are privileged at the detri-
ment of longer term, strategic intelligence aimed at influencing decisions, not actions or 
operations. This way the specialization of the intelligence agencies in short-term opera-
tional and tactical intelligence is reinforced, fuelling a logic of tactical results, which create 
a demand for more tactical results, that can only emphasize the need for actionable intelli-
gence. Here the vicious cycle starts again. 
5.2.6. Lack of Unified Vision and Understanding 
A very important issue that has yet to be resolved is the unification of intelligence’s con-
ceptual base. It is clear from the Literature Review in Chapter 2 that there exists no con-
sensus over the meaning of intelligence, or of other concepts involving intelligence in stra-
tegic, tactical, operational or internal dimensions. Even though this is a good sign and re-
 
 
flects an ongoing debate within academia, the same lack of consensus cannot extend to 
the Colombian intelligence agencies. This is not just a question of semantics.  
If there is to be clarity about the roles and missions of the intelligence agencies then there 
needs to be clarity about the concepts that underlie those tasks. The lack of a single lan-
guage within the Colombian intelligence community may become an obstacle down the 
line in the integration process particularly if there is going to be any successful attempt to 
clarify the missions and roles the agencies are expected to fulfil.  
In this sense, there seems to be a lack of clarity about what intelligence can provide for the 
consumers, how to integrate the intelligence community’s efforts for a better product, and 
how an integrated and effective intelligence community will look in future. Those seem to 
be the kind of questions that have not yet been answered by the community and that need 
to be addressed if a coherent policy on this issue is expected. Failing to do so will merely 
continue the way in which the intelligence agencies have evolved over the years, a pro-
cess described in Chapter 4 as haphazard and disorderly. 
5.2.7. Lack of Legal Framework 
As a result of the lack of clarity on both the intelligence producers and consumers, the in-
telligence activities in Colombia do not have a legal framework. This necessary process of 
legalizing the intelligence activity in Colombia, includes the framework for the intelligence 
activity, the formalizing of JIC and the issuing of judicial guidelines that allow intelligence to 
integrate further, by including the active prevention of crimes. Such an exercise will require 
prospective thinking, especially when variables such as the intelligence legal framework 
depend upon its outcome. 
5.3. Threats and Opportunities 
The path towards the integration of the intelligence agencies, has already been marked, 
not only by the Democratic Defence and Security Policy, but also by the resolution of the 
members of the intelligence community. Since 1995, when the SINAI was first launched as 
an answer to the lack of coordination within the intelligence community, a long way has 
already been conquered. Although the process demands time to consolidate, other threats 
stand in the way. 
Infiltration by terrorist groups of any origin or drug trafficking organizations remains one of 
the most dangerous menaces to the integration of the intelligence agencies. It not only un-
 
 
dermines trust within the community, but also erodes whatever confidence the intelligence 
consumers may have gained, as the recent DAS scandals demonstrate. Secrecy will not 
be acceptable to any free society if it is used against the values and principles that that 
society upholds. 
Intelligence integration will not happen if the intelligence producers feel whatever solutions 
are offered have been imposed on them or feel that they have been left out of any trans-
formation process. The experience brought about by the SINAI experiment in 1995 is a 
clear point in case. Integration will neither work if the transformations do not reflect the cul-
ture and power struggles which are present in the community. Reforms based on outside 
ideas or academic models will not work, because in the end, structures are there for the 
people. No matter how good a framework has been constructed, in the end much will de-
pend on how the people that make up the intelligence community relate to each other. 
This is one major opportunity in Colombia’s present circumstances. The people that make 
up the community know their jobs and are pushing for better results. Better integration of 
the intelligence agencies is known to be a right tool in this direction. The complete vision of 
the intelligence activity gathered by the then Viceminister of Defence, now Director of 
DAS, as the representative of the Defence Minister to JIC, means that his is an integral 
perspective of the whole spectrum. Changes setup at DAS and other intelligence agencies 
will be executed with the whole community in perspective, as opposed to one single entity. 
This opportunity comes as part of the success of the jointness concept in the operational 
and administrative realms. In this sense, the jointness required among the intelligence 
agencies will receive a strong support from the benefits that have been acquired through-
out the State Security Force’s developments. With the right plan, the opportunity to boost 
intelligence integration will be close at hand. 
5.4. Recommendations 
5.4.1. Broadening the Intelligence Debate in Colombia 
 Perhaps no other single recommendation is as important as broadening the internal de-
bate, involving academia, the private sector and government, around the intelligence 
community, its role, its evolution and its future. Presently, the lack of research on any sub-
ject regarding intelligence management, organization and oversight is a definite limitation 
to further and more educated debate about how much and what type of intelligence is re-
quired at present and in future by Colombia.  
 
 
Educational institutions such as the Universidad de los Andes and the Universidad Militar 
Nueva Granada, have recently given steps in the right direction through the creation of 
postgraduate studies in matters relating to security and national defence, of which intelli-
gence is a module. But intelligence training institutions such as the Army’s Escuela de In-
teligencia y Contrainteligencia Brigadier General Charry Solano (Brigadier General Charry 
Solano Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence School) and the DAS’s Escuela de Detec-
tives Aquimindia (Aquimindia Detective School), have yet to launch similar initiatives to al-
low civilians and military personnel, other than those pertaining to the intelligence commu-
nity, to acquire the necessary knowledge. Only in this way will the debate be enriched to 
become a useful source of improvement to the intelligence community’s advantage.  
5.4.2. Redefinition of the Secrecy Culture 
For this to happen, the secrecy culture surrounding the intelligence activities will have to 
be redefined. The intelligence product is to be shared not only among the intelligence con-
sumers for actions and decisions to be taken, but also among the intelligence community 
to get as broad and in depth product as possible. Secrecy in intelligence is all about deny-
ing sensitive information from the enemy, not about hiding every activity from the outside. 
Such an attitude only generates mistrust and is the perfect setting for abuses and corrup-
tion, results that are of no interest to the intelligence agencies. Shared information has to 
be controlled within the intelligence community so as to separate restricted from general 
information, the raw material necessary for an outside understanding of the intelligence 
community.     
 
5.4.3. National Intelligence Plan and Requirements based approach 
One central issue in the improvement of the integration among the intelligence community 
is the elaboration of an intelligence action plan that defines which agency does what and 
with what resources. It is a first but necessary step towards a more coherent approach on 
the use of whatever capabilities are available on the intelligence ‘market’. This plan has to 
be designed within the intelligence community but with the priorities being determined by 
the intelligence consumers. Only in this way can there be a guarantee of the necessary 
coupling between the supply and demand of intelligence.  
 
 
To be more precise, the National Security Council, made up of the President, the Defence, 
Interior and Foreign Affairs Ministers, the Armed Forces Commander, and the heads of the 
Army, Air Force, Navy and National Police, should all define the priorities to be worked out 
by the intelligence agencies in their national intelligence plan. None of the intelligence 
heads would have a say in the definition of the prioritized information requirements be-
cause working at both, the supply and demand side, can eventually produce a negative 
influence in the intelligence product outcome. Policy has to be clearly separated from intel-
ligence. 
The resources for the execution of the national intelligence plan would be linked with the 
budget approved for every agency. In this sense, it is necessary to conform a committee 
made up of the intelligence agencies, the Ministry of Economy and the National Planning 
Deparment - DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeacion) to ensure that no duplicity in 
the distribution of resources is occurring and that the national intelligence plan, defined by 
the intelligence community but based and approved by the intelligence consumer’s priori-
ties, matches the resources handed out to the agencies. In the end, the National Security 
Council’s approval of the national intelligence plan would tie-up the distribution of re-
sources for the prioritized tasks. 
5.4.4. Monitoring and Evaluation 
The monitoring and evaluation role over the national intelligence plan needs to be decided. 
At this stage there are many examples of intelligence reforms having gone wrong. An intel-
ligence ‘czar’ attached to the Presidency, an overall Director of National Intelligence, and a 
collegiate committee, are just some of the choices that have been available. However, the 
Colombian solution must attend two main issues: the fact that all intelligence agencies, for 
the moment, are independent from one another and no one exerts control over the other, 
and the recognition that all resources, for the near future, will have to be directed to solve 
the internal conflict.  
On the one hand, the Ministry of Defence, with four of the six intelligence agencies under 
its roof, appears as an obvious choice for centralized control. After all, the Defence Minis-
try has the military and police intelligence agencies, which account for a large proportion of 
the intelligence produced today. Incorporating DAS and UIAF would be a much easier task 
than any other solution. Within this intelligence community, the Minister of Defence would 
exert no control, only a monitoring and evaluating role which should be the responsibility of 
a small bureaucracy responding to the Minister.  
 
 
This arrangement poses another problem. The Director of DAS holds a political position 
considered almost as a Ministerial post. This makes him the highest-level officer within the 
intelligence community. Therefore, he should play a special role, accordingly. Remember 
this is not about how things should be, but how they are. In this sense, the director of DAS 
should act as the intelligence community’s voice, working very closely with the monitoring 
and evaluation group established under the Minister of Defence. Thus, he should be re-
sponsible for the dissemination of intelligence at the highest level, the National Security 
Council.    
5.4.5. Unified vision 
If the national intelligence plan is going to work, then there needs to be a unification of the 
basic concepts within the intelligence community. For this task, the service training schools 
of the Army, Air Force, Navy, National Police and DAS should be instructed to create a 
committee, which would be responsible for elaborating such a document. This would not 
only mean that a single language would be spoken around the intelligence community, but 
would also open a space where best practices could be exchanged, teachers could be ro-
tated and ideas over the intelligence community’s future could be put to the test.  
In this sense, these educational facilities have the responsibility of contributing to the 
moulding of what and how to achieve an integrated and effective intelligence community. 
Indicators to measure the degree of integration and the effectiveness of the integration 
process over the intelligence product are just two elements of a broader spectrum of is-
sues that could be targeted in order to improve the transformation process from single 
agencies to interagency integration. Although integration is now on the agenda, a concrete 
desired result must be defined as a community goal.   
5.4.6. Legislative Framework for the Intelligence Community 
Finally, the legal issues regarding intelligence must be addressed. Those are the legisla-
tion framework for the intelligence activities, the institutionalization by law of the JIC, and 
the promotion of judicial guidelines that take into account the terrorist threats faced by the 
country allowing formal judicial procedures to begin on a preventive basis. Only by doing 
so will the intelligence agencies be able to cooperate and integrate effectively, without fear 
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